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I. Introduction
In 1990 the Wisconsin Legislature enacted the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program (“MPCP”).1 The first publicly funded voucher program of
its type in the United States,2 the MPCP permitted up to one percent (1%)
or approximately 1000 of the enrolled children in Milwaukee Public

* Professor of Education, Department of Educational Leadership and Policy
Analysis, University of Wisconsin-Madison. I am grateful to the staff of the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice for their helpful comments and suggestions in
the development of this article.
1. 1989 WISCONSIN ACT 336, § 228 (MAY 11, 1990). The current version of the law is
codified at: WIS. STAT. §119.23 (2014).
2. School Vouchers, History, National Conference of State Legislatures,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/school-choice-vouchers.aspx (last visited Feb. 10,
2015).
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Schools (“MPS”) to attend private non-sectarian schools within the city’s
limits if their family’s income was no more than 175% of the federal
poverty level.3 Participating schools were limited to enrolling no more than
49% of their overall student population by means of the voucher, 4 which
provided approximately $2500 per student.5
Not surprisingly, the program was extremely controversial and was
soon challenged in state court. When the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard
Davis v. Grover 6 in 1992, seven schools and 341 children participated in
the MPCP.7 The court entertained three allegations: (1) the law was invalid
because the procedures used to enact it violated the state’s constitutional
prohibition against “private” or “local” bills; (2) the law violated the state
constitution’s education clause; and (3) the law violated the state’s public
purpose doctrine.8 The court, splitting 4–3, upheld the program on all three
counts.9 The majority’s reasoning repeatedly referenced the “experimental”
nature of the program and the limits placed by the legislature on
participation in support of the conclusion reached.10
However, the “experimental” program analyzed in 1992 differs
dramatically from that in operation now. The MPCP has been revised
several times, each time expanding the scope of the program, both in terms
of the schools and students eligible to participate.11 Both religious and non3. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Wis. 1992).
4. Id. at 464.
5. Id. at 476 n.23.
6. 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992). As will be discussed further below, the program
was later challenged and upheld on Establishment of Religion Clause grounds after the
program was expanded to permit private religious schools to participate. See infra Part III.
7. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE
PROGRAM: AN EVALUATION 11 (Feb., 2000), available at http://legis.wisconsin.
gov/lab/reports/00-2full.pdf.
8. Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 462–63.
9. Id. at 477.
10. Id. at 474.
11. See infra Part II. The Wisconsin legislature has also created 2 additional voucher
programs. First, the Racine Parental Choice Program (RPCP) for Racine, Wisconsin (Act 32
(Wis. 2011)), began in the 2011-2012 school year. Data for 2014-2015 indicate that 15
private schools and 1740 students participated in the program (WIS. DEP’T OF PUB.
INSTRUCTION, RPCP FACTS AND FIGURES FOR 2014-2015 (2014), available at
http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/choice_facts_statistics). Next was a statewide voucher program (Act
20 (Wis. 2013)). The statewide program (in locations other than Milwaukee and Racine) is
limited to 1000 students in the 2014-2015 school year, and no more than 1% of any single
school district’s membership thereafter (WIS. STAT. § 118.60(2)(be)). Data released by the
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction indicate that 1013 students (997.5 full time
equivalent students) and 31 private schools participated in the program this year (WIS. DEP’T
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religious schools may now register as MPCP participating schools.12 There
are no longer limits on the percentage of students a private school may
enroll through the program13 and in fact the average MPCP school enrolls
more than 80% of its students through vouchers.14 There are no longer
limits on the total number of students from Milwaukee who may
participate.15 The schools eligible to participate no longer must be
physically located within the city of Milwaukee, but may be located
anywhere in the state.16 Eligibility for low-income families has been
expanded from 175% to 300% of the federal poverty level,17 an amount
greater than the median household income for the state.18 As would be
anticipated and as will be described more fully in sections to follow,
participation in the program has grown steadily and as of November 2014
includes 113 participating private schools that enroll a total of 26,930
students and costs the state approximately $191,000,000.19
The “experiment” has also yielded a variety of research reports
throughout its history.20 A recent report suggests that children enrolled in
PUB. INSTRUCTION, STATEWIDE VOUCHER ENROLLMENT COUNTS (OCTOBER 23, 2014),
available at http://news.dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/imce/eis/pdf/dpinr2014_110.pdf). Both
programs are now codified at WIS. STAT. § 118.60.
12. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)(1)(b).
13. Limitations originally found in WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(b)(2) (1990) and repealed
by 1995 Wis. Act 27, §4003 (July 28, 1995).
14. Letter from Tony Evers, Wis. State Superintendent of Pub. Instruction to the
Members of the Joint Comm. on Fin., at 2 (May 23, 2011), available at
http://issuu.com/sparty1216/docs/dpi_letter_to_jcf5.23.11.
15. 2011 Wis. Act. 32, § 2539 (June 30, 2011).
16. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a).
17. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)(1). Therefore, to be eligible for participation in the
MPCP for 2014-15, the family income must be no greater than $34,953 for a family of 1,
$47,181 for a family of 2, $59,409 for a family of 3, and $71,637 for family of 4 (For each
additional member add $12,228). WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, 2014-15 SCHOOL YEAR,
THE MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM, INFORMATION FOR PARENTS (2014), available
at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/files/sms/pdf/2014-15_mpcp_brochure.pdf.
18. United States Census Bureau, State & County Quickfacts: Wisconsin (2014),
available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55000.html (reporting that the median
household income for Wisconsin is $52,627).
19. WISCONSIN DEP’T OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, MPCP Facts and Figures for 2014-15
(November, 2014) available at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/choice_facts_statistics [hereinafter
MPCP Facts and Figures for 2014-15].
20. See e.g., John F. Witte, The Milwaukee Voucher Experiment, 20 EDUC.
EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 229 (December 21, 1998); JOHN F. WITTE, THE MARKET
APPROACH TO EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA'S FIRST VOUCHER PROGRAM (2001);
Research Brief, 100 PUBL. POLICY FORUM 1, (Feb. 2012). For official reports completed by
the Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, see: An Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental
OF
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MPCP schools do no better, and in some cases worse, than similarly
situated MPS students.21 These results are particularly interesting since
MPCP schools are not required to serve children with special needs (e.g.
children with disabilities or children learning English) in the same manner
as MPS schools.22 In fact, less than 2% of the children enrolled in MPCP
schools have identifiable disabilities, in contrast to nearly 20% of MPS
students identified with disabilities.23
That difference in the proportion of children with disabilities served in
the MPCP spawned the program’s most recent legal challenge. In June of
2011, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Disability Rights
Wisconsin (DRW) filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) alleging that the MPCP discriminates against children with
disabilities.24 The complaint claimed that the state violates the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA)25 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
(Section 504)26 by implementing a program that is not accessible to all
children, resulting in the effective segregation of children with disabilities
Choice Program, Report 00-2 (Feb. 2000); Test Score Data for Pupils in the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program (Sept. 2008); Test Score Data for Pupils in the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program, Report 2 of 5 (Aug. 2009); Test Score Data for Pupils in the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program, Report 3 of 5 (Aug. 2010); Test Score Data for Pupils in the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, Report 4 of 5 (Aug. 2011); Test Score Data for Pupils
in the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, Report 5 of 5 (Aug. 2012). For seven research
reports conducted by the University of Arkansas, School Choice Demonstration Project, see
http://www.uaedreform.org/category/department-of-education-reform/scdp/milwaukeeevaluation/mpcp-final-reports/.
21. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, OVERALL MPS RESULTS HIGHER THAN CHOICE
SCHOOLS ON STATEWIDE EXAMS 2 (2011), available at https://millermps.files.wordpress.
com/2011/03/dpi-comparison-mps-voucher-wkce-testing.pdf.
22. See WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM &
RACINE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS – 2015-16 SCHOOL
YEAR, 4 (2015), available at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/imce/sms/Choice/MPCP
and RPCP FAQ 2015-16.pdf.
23. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 21, at 2.
24. Complaint at 3, ACLU v. Wisconsin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 7, 2011).
available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/complaint_to_doj_re_milwaukee_voucher_
program_final.pdf.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability. It includes 5 titles. Title I: Employment
Discrimination; Title II: Discrimination in Public Services; Title III: Discrimination in
Public Accommodations; Title IV: Discrimination in Telecommunications; Title V:
Miscellaneous Provisions. Title II applies to programs created and operated by public
entities: 42 U.S.C. §§12131-12134; 28 C.F.R. 35 et seq.
26. 29 U.S.C. §794; 34 C.F.R. 104 et seq. Section 504 prohibits discrimination on the
basis of disability by any recipient of federal financial assistance.
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in MPS.27 Moreover, they argued that in violation of the ADA and Section
504, MPCP schools actively discourage from enrolling and routinely turn
away children with disabilities who could be accommodated in their
programs.28 Characterizing MPCP schools as “private in name only,” the
organizations called on the Department of Justice to investigate the matter
and ensure MPCP satisfies all non-discrimination requirements.29
The expansion of the MPCP and the charges made regarding children
with disabilities focus attention on the public/private distinction typically
used to describe schools.30 The issues raised in the complaint to the
Department of Justice in combination with the expansion of the program
since its “experimental” start also suggest the need to re-examine the
constitutional analysis from Davis v. Grover with regard to the Education
Clause and Public Purpose Doctrine.31 Do the changes enacted by the state
legislature that result in a large and growing voucher program continue to
satisfy state constitutional mandates? If the program results in
concentrations of children with disabilities in public schools, does it satisfy
the non-discriminatory requirements of both state and federal law? These
questions have particular import not only for the MPCP but also for the two
other voucher programs created by the Wisconsin legislature, the Racine
Parental Choice Program and the Wisconsin Parental Choice Program. 32
Although this analysis concentrates on the MPCP, the issues examined have
equal application to Wisconsin’s other voucher programs.33
Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to review the history of the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program and to re-examine the program with
respect to three legal issues: (1) does the MPCP operate free from
discrimination on the basis of disability?; (2) does the MPCP comport with
the state constitution’s education clause that requires the legislature to
provide for district schools that are as nearly uniform as practicable?; and
(3) does the MPCP comport with the public purpose doctrine? This analysis
is divided into five parts. Part II reviews the statutory history of the MPCP.
Part III describes current participation in the MPCP. In Part IV previous
27. Complaint, ACLU v. Wisconsin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 24, at 3.
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id. at 27.
30. See id.
31. Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 477.
32. Supra, note 11.
33. The analysis may also have some application in other states with voucher
programs, including Indiana (IC 20-51-1 and IC 20-51-4), and Louisiana (La. Rev. Stat.
§§ 17:4011-4025), and Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3313.974-979).
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judicial rulings and the pending ACLU/DRW allegations about the program
are reviewed. Part V analyzes the three legal issues of concern and Part VI
provides a concluding discussion.
II. A Brief Statutory History of the MPCP
As noted above, the MPCP began in 1990 and was signed into law by
then Governor Tommy Thompson.34 The law has been amended twenty
times, with the most recent changes made in 2013.35 The law has also
grown both in participation and scope. The original law comprised only 9
sections covering a little more than 1 page. The statute now numbers 15
provisions36 and fills seven pages of Chapter 119. While the changes have
expanded the program substantially, the Wisconsin legislature has also
enacted increasing requirements for private schools’ participation. This
section reviews the evolution of the current statute with respect to 5 issues:
(1) student eligibility; (2) private school participation; (3) authority of the
State Superintendent and Department of Public Instruction (DPI);
(4) program evaluation; and (5) funding.
Table 1 summarizes the changes made to provisions related to student
eligibility. As illustrated, the MPCP initially defined low-income students
as those whose families made no more than 1.75 times the federal poverty
level.37 In 2005, that provision was amended to permit voucher students
whose family income increased after admittance to remain in the private
school, provided the family’s income did not exceed 2.2 times the poverty
level.38 That limit on eligibility increased again in 2011,39 now defining any
student as eligible if family income totals no more than 3.0 times the
poverty level and permits an admitted student to remain in the program if
34. 1989 WISCONSIN ACT 336, § 228 (MAY 11, 1990).
35. The law was originally enacted by the legislature in 1989 Wisconsin Act 336.
Amendments were adopted through: (1) 1993 Wisconsin Act 16, (2) 1995 Wisconsin Act 27;
(3) 1995 Wisconsin Act 216; (4) 1997 Wisconsin Act 27; (5) 1997 Wisconsin Act 113; (6)
1999 Wisconsin Act 9; (7) 2001 Wisconsin Act 16; (8) 2001 Wisconsin Act 105; (9) 2003
Wisconsin Act 33; (10) 2003 Wisconsin Act 155; (11) 2005 Wisconsin Act 25; (12) 2005
Wisconsin Act 125; (13) 2009 Wisconsin Act 28; (14) 2009 Wisconsin Act 96; (15) 2011
Wisconsin Act 32; (16) 2011 Wisconsin Act 47; (17) 2013 Wisconsin Act 8; (18) 2013
Wisconsin Act 20; (19) 2013 Wisconsin Act 237; (20) 2013 Wisconsin Act 256.
36. WIS. STAT. §§ 119.23(1), (2), (3), (3m), (4), (4m), (4r), (5), (6), (6m), (7), (8), (9),
(10), (11).
37. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)(1) (1990).
38. 2005 Wis. Act 25, § 1895h (July 26, 2005).
39. 2011 Wis. Act 32, § 2536c (June 30, 2011).
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family income increases thereafter.40 Similarly, the cap on the total number
of vouchers available grew from 1% to 1.5% in 1993,41 to 15% in 1996,42 to
22,500 students in 2006.43 Act 32 removed the cap entirely for the program
beginning with the 2011-2012 school year.44 The law also initially set limits
on students’ previous school experiences.45 Over time, those constraints,
too, have all been removed. As such, any child residing in Milwaukee is
eligible for a voucher, whether or not they have ever attended an MPS
school.46 The practical effect of the provisions for enrollment eligibility is
that the vouchers have always funded three types of students –those exiting
MPS schools, those who are attending any school for the first time, and
those already enrolled in private schools who merely shifted from private to
public funding.47

40. Wis. Stat. § 119.23(2)(a)(1)(a).
41. 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 2300 (Aug. 11, 1993).
42. 1995 Wis. Act 216, § 54 (April 29, 1996).
43. 2005 Wis. Act 125, § 7 (March 25, 2006).
44. 2011 Wis. Act 32 § 2539, repealing 119.23(2)(b) which read: “No more than
22,500 pupils . . . may attend private schools under this section.”
45. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)(2) (1990) (“In the previous school year the pupil was
enrolled in the school district operating under this chapter, was attending a private school
under this section or was not enrolled in school.”).
46. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a) (2013).
47. This trend was replicated with Wisconsin’s newest voucher program. Of the 500
seats available in the statewide program the first year of its operation in 2013-14, 72.9 %
students previously attended a private school, 21.2% previously attended a public school;
3.3% were entering school for the first time, 2.4% had been previously homeschooled, and 1
student had attended school in another state in the previous school year. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB.
INSTRUCTION, WPCP FACTS AND FIGURES FOR 2013-2014 (November 2013) available at
http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/files/sms/pdf/wpcp_fact-and-figures_13-14_2013_10.pdf.
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Table 1: Changes to MPCP Provisions Concerning Student Eligibility
Original
Requirement
Family income
does not exceed
1.75 times the
federal poverty
level

Resides in the city
and previous year
and attended MPS,
the participating
private school, or
was not enrolled
Total cap set at 1%
of MPS enrollment

Changes and Year of Change
If family income
increases after
admittance, child &
siblings remain eligible
if income is below 2.2
times the federal
poverty level (2005)

Raised to 3.0 times
the federal poverty
level and permits
remaining in the
program even if
income increases
(2011).

Added children
enrolled in grades K-3
in any private school in
the city regardless of
MPCP participation
(1995)
Increased to 1.5%
(1993).

Repealed (result is
that any child
residing in
Milwaukee may
participate) (2005)
Increased to 7% for Set cap at Eliminated
1995-96 and 15% 22,500
cap (2011).
for 1996-97 (1995). pupils
(2006).

An examination of MPCP provisions governing private school
participation reveals two important trends. First, the number of schools
permitted to participate and the scope of that participation has increased.
Schools initially had to be both non-sectarian and located within Milwaukee
city limits.48 The legislature removed the first limitation in 1995 when it
expanded to include religious schools49 and the second in 2011 when it
permitted any private school to participate, opening the program to
suburban private schools.50 Another major expansion involves limitations
on the total number of voucher students any school could enroll. The
program initially required that each participating school be more privately,
than publicly funded by limiting total enrollment to 49% of the student
population.51 That percentage increased to 65% in 199352 and was removed
entirely with the MPCP’s expansion to include religious schools in 1995.53
Finally, beginning with the 2011-2012 school year, participating schools
were granted the authority to charge reasonable fees (e.g., book fees, lab
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a) (1990).
1995 Wis. Act 27, § 4002 (July 28, 1995).
2011 Wis. Act 32, § 2536 (June 30, 2011).
WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(b)(2) (1990).
1993 Wis. Act 16, § 2300 (Aug. 11, 1993).
1995 Wis. Act 27, § 4003 (July 28, 1995).
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fees) and tuition over and above the voucher amount.54 The latter authority
only applies to high schools and only if the family makes more than 2.2
times the federal poverty limit.55
A second trend involves the growth in the number of conditions
schools must agree to in order to participate in the program. Initially, the
schools had to commit to very little.56 They could not discriminate on the
basis of race,57 had to meet health and safety codes that apply to public
schools,58 and they had to meet their choice of one of 4 standards, which
included:
1) At 70% of the pupils in the program advance one grade
level each year.
2) The private school’s average attendance rate for the
pupils in the program at least 90%.
3) At least 80% of the pupils in the program demonstrate
significant academic progress.
4) At least 70% of the families of the pupils in the
program meet parent involvement criteria established by
the private school.59
These requirements remain in the current law, but the legislature has
increased conditions of participation several times in the twenty years of
program operation. The first new regulation was added in 1995 and
required schools to submit to financial audits.60 Then, following some
highly publicized problems with some participating schools,61 the
legislature created several more conditions of participation in 2004 and
granted DPI some direct regulatory authority it had previously lacked. New
provisions added in 2004:

54. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(3m)(2014).
55. Id.
56. As discussed infra at note 121 and accompanying text, the Wisconsin DPI
attempted to regulate the program more fully, but those regulations were struck down in
Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992).
57. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)(4).
58. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)(5).
59. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(7)(a).
60. 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 4007r (July 29, 1995).
61. See e.g., Voucher School Owes State $330K; Teachers Gripe Over Pay, CAPITAL
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2003), at 12C; State Has Few Options with School, CAPITAL TIMES (Sept.
15, 2003), at 5A; Sarah Carr, 2 Schools of Thought Clash on Voucher Plan Controls,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Oct. 12, 2003), at A1; Sarah Carr and Nahal Toosi, Voucher
School May Be in Financial Trouble, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Dec. 12, 2003), at B1.
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Required participating private schools to provide a
certificate of occupancy in advance or participation.62
 Gave the State Superintendent the authority to
immediately terminate participation of school if there
was imminent harm to health and safety of children.63
 Required financial audits to meet standards.64
 Required participating private schools to provide proof
of financial viability,65 sound fiscal practices,66 and that
the school’s administrator has had fiscal management
training.67
The legislature increased regulatory control again in 2005 and 2006, adding
provisions more directly related to instructional quality, requiring that:
 Teachers be high school graduates or hold high school
equivalence diplomas.68
 Schools be accredited by 1 of 5 private school
organizations.69
 Schools administer nationally normed tests in reading,
math, & science in 4th, 8th and 10th grades and submit
results to the School Choice Demonstration Project at
the University of Arkansas.70 The Legislative Audit

62. 2003 Wis. Act 155 § 4 (March 31, 2004).
63. 2003 Wis. Act 155 § 5 (March 31, 2004).
64. 2003 Wis. Act 155 § 1 (March 31, 2004).
65. 2003 Wis. Act 155 § 4 (March 31, 2004).
66. 2003 Wis. Act 155 § 2 (March 31, 2004).
67. 2003 Wis. Act 155 § 4 (March 31, 2004).
68. 2005 Wis. Act 25 § 1895t (July 26, 2005).
69. 2005 Wis. Act 125 § 6 (March 25, 2006). Those organizations were: Institute for
the Transformation of Learning at Marquette University, the Wisconsin North Central
Association, the Wisconsin Religious and Independent Schools Accreditation, the
Independent Schools Association of the Central States, and the Archdiocese of Milwaukee.
In 2013, the law was amended to omit the Institute for the Transformation of Learning at
Marquette University, substitute “the diocese or archdiocese within which the private school
is located” for the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, and add the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran
Synod School Accreditation, the National Lutheran School Accreditation, and the Wisconsin
Association of Christian Schools to the list of acceptable accrediting entities. 2013 Wis. Act
20, § 1872m, codified at WIS. STAT. § 119.23(7)(ad).
70. 2005 Wis. Act 125 § 8 (March 25, 2006). The reports by the School Choice
Demonstration project may be found at: http://www.uaedreform.org/category/department-ofeducation-reform/scdp/milwaukee-evaluation/mpcp-final-reports/
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Bureau was directed to review that analysis and report
to the legislature.71
The trend to hold schools further accountable for instructional quality
continued with new provisions in 2009. The most significant of these
provisions required MPCP schools to adopt the academic standards in
mathematics, science, reading, writing, geography and history72 and
participate in the state achievement testing for the first time in program
history.73 Provisions also now require teachers and administrators to hold at
least a bachelor’s degree74 and teacher’s aides to be high school graduates.75
The most recent changes require participating schools to participate in the
state’s student information system.76 Table A1 in Appendix A summarizes
these changes to private school participation and their relationship to the
original provisions.
Not surprisingly, as the legislature set more conditions for school
participation, it likewise increased the authority of the State Superintendent
and the Department of Public Instruction77 to take action if the school failed
71. 2005 Wis. Act 125 § 8 (March 25, 2006). For the official reports completed by the
Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, see: An Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program, Report 00-2 (Feb. 2000); Test Score Data for Pupils in the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program (Sept. 2008); Test Score Data for Pupils in the Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program, Report 2 of 5 (Aug. 2009); Test Score Data for Pupils in the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program, Report 3 of 5 (August 2010); Test Score Data for Pupils in the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program, Report 4 of 5 (Aug. 2011); Test Score Data for Pupils in the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, Report 5 of 5 (Aug. 2012).
72. 2009 Wis. Act 28 § 2289 (July 1, 2009). The provision incorporates WIS. STAT.
§ 118.30(1g)(a)(3) which reads: “The governing body of each private school participating in
the program under s. 119.23 shall adopt pupil academic standards in mathematics, science,
reading and writing, geography, and history. The governing body of the private school may
adopt the pupil academic standards issued by the governor as executive order no. 326, dated
January 13, 1998.”
73. 2009 Wis. Act 28 § 2290 (July 1, 2009); amended slightly by 2013 Wis. Act 20
§ 1874 (June 30, 2013). The provision, now codified at WIS. STAT. § 119.23(7)(e),
incorporates WIS. STAT. § 118.30 (1s) which requires MPCP schools to administer tests
adopted or approved by the state superintendent in 4th, 8th, 9th, and 10th grades.
74. 2009 Wis. Act 28 § 2278d (July 1, 2009).
75. 2009 Wis. Act 28 § 2289.
76. 2013 Wis. Act 256 §7 (April 9, 2014).
77. Wisconsin’s State Superintendent of Public Instruction is a constitutional officer
and elected in a statewide election for a 4-year term (Wis. Const. Article X, Section 1). This
structure led to a situation in both Davis v. Grover (supra note 6) and Jackson v. Benson
(infra note 143 and accompanying text) where the state superintendent and governor stood
on different sides of the disputes about the program. For a discussion of this political
division, see e.g. Julie Underwood, Choice in Education: The Wisconsin Experience, 68
EDUC. L. REP. 229, 235 (1991).
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to meet program requirements. While the statute does not grant the
authority to bar a school for poor academic performance generally78 or to
assert oversight in a manner consistent with the authority over public
schools, the revisions have strengthened state oversight as shown in Table
2. The agency can withhold funds from schools under some conditions 79
and can require a number of assurances regarding the facility and
curriculum in order to approve participation.80 While the school has to
provide the information to the agency, the DPI does not have the authority
to approve that curriculum or direct a participating school to add to or omit
anything from its course of study.81 The DPI may only take immediate
action terminating a school’s authorization to participate in the program if it
is determined “that conditions at the private school present an imminent
threat to the health and safety of pupils.”82

78. See, for example, a recent report of an MPCP school that closed precipitously in
December 2013, leaving 66 students without an academic home. Newspaper accounts report
“John Johnson, DPI spokesman, said Wednesday that the department's authority over
voucher schools, which are all private and predominantly religious, is limited. There's
nothing in state law that allows the DPI to take action against a private school because of
low academic performance or because of a school leader's personal finances, Johnson said.”
Erin Richards, Leaders of Closed Milwaukee Voucher School are now in Florida,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Jan. 15, 2014). The statute does allow the superintendent to deny
participation to a school that fails to achieve or has lost its accreditation for the school year
following the loss (WIS. STAT. §119.23(10)(ar)).
79. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(10)(d). Those conditions are: (1) Misrepresented required
information; (2) Failed to provide the notice or pay the fee required; (3) Failed to refund to
the state any overpayment; (4) Failed to meet at least one of the required academic
standards; (5) Failed to provide the information to parents; (6) Failed to adopt appropriate
academic standards or excuse a student from religious activities at parental request;
(7) Failed to keep student records, provide the same to parents, or issue a diploma or
certificate for graduating students; (8) hired a person disqualified by the state superintendent
for improper previous conduct.
80. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(6m)(b).
81. Id.
82. 2003 Wis. Act 155 § 5 (Mar. 31, 2004) (codified at WIS. STAT. § 119.23(10)(b)).
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Table 2: Changes to MPCP Provisions Concerning DPI Responsibilities
and Authority
Original requirement

Changes and year of change

Provide information to
parents about program

Establish a public
information campaign
(1993)

Information campaign
requirement repealed,
but original provision
retained (1995)

State Superintendent
monitor performance in
relation to 4 standards

Repealed and replaced by
authority to bar
participation or withhold
funds if application to
participate misrepresented
information, failed to
provide requisite
assurances by statutory
date, or failed to meet 1 of
4 standards. (2004)
Revoke participation
immediately if imminent
threat to students’ health or
safety. (2004)
Revoke authorization to
participate at end of school
year if school fails to
maintain accreditation.
(2013).

May withhold funds for
non-compliance with
student data
requirements. (2014)

Provisions requiring program evaluation tell an interesting story. The
original law included provisions for programmatic evaluation, including a
comparison between the performance of students in MPCP schools and
those similarly situated in MPS schools.83 Those original evaluative
components were removed when the program expanded to include religious
schools.84 Given the likelihood of a constitutional challenge under the
Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment, it appears that

83. 1989 Act 336 § 228, (May 11, 1990) (codified at WIS. STAT.
§ 119.23(5)(d)(1990)). The provision directed the state superintendent to “Annually submit
to the chief clerk of each house of the legislature for distribution to the appropriate standing
committees under s. 13.172(3), and to each private school participating in the program under
this section, a report comparing the academic achievement, daily attendance record,
percentage of dropouts, percentage of pupils suspended and expelled and parental
involvement activities of pupils attending a private school under this section and pupils
enrolled in the school district operating under this chapter.”
84. 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 4007m (July 28, 1995).

344

21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 331 (2015)

the legislature removed provisions that could make the program vulnerable
to claims of “excessive entanglement” between government and religion
under an application of the analysis from Lemon v. Kurtzman.85 After the
program survived that scrutiny by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 199886
and the U.S. Supreme Court likewise upheld a similar Cleveland program
in 2002,87 the legislature again instituted an evaluation component in
2006.88 The provision called for testing and data collection to be analyzed
by the School Choice Demonstration Project at the University of Arkansas
and audited by the Legislative Audit Bureau, with comparative reports due
annually from 2007-2011.89 Now that those evaluations are complete, the
law has no active evaluation provision.90
Table 3: Changes to MPCP Provisions Concerning Evaluation of the
Program
Original requirement

Changes and year of change

State superintendent: Submit
an annual report comparing
MPCP schools to MPS
schools on academic
achievement, daily
attendance, dropout rate,
suspension and expulsion
data, & parental involvement
State superintendent may
conduct financial or
performance evaluations
Legislative audit bureau
perform an audit by 1/15/95.

Repealed (1995)

Repealed (1995)

Perform audit by
1/15/2000 (1995)
Legislative audit
bureau must
review results of
School Choice
Demonstration

Repealed since audits completed
(2001)
Repealed evaluation and
legislative audit provision (2013)

85. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). The “Lemon Test”
requires that any state action (1) serve a legitimate secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect
which neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoids excessive entanglement between
government and religion.
86. Jackson v. Benson, N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
87. Zelman v. Simmons Harris, 536 U.S. 739 (2002).
88. 2005 Wis. Act 125, § 8 (March 25, 2006).
89. Id.
90. See 2013 Wis. Act 8, § 38 (March 28, 2013) (repealing the requirement that data
be provided for evaluation).
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Project annually
from 2007-2011
(2006)

Finally, the funding of the vouchers has changed over time. Initially
the MPCP vouchers were funded with the tax dollars that would have gone
to MPS instead going to the private participating school.91 Since then a
complex formula has evolved that shares costs for the program between
MPS and general state revenues. A thorough discussion of the funding
mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say here that a
maximum voucher amount ($7,210 for elementary students and $7,856 for
2014-2015) is set by statute,92 and the voucher must not exceed actual
educational costs spent by a school.93 Program costs are currently shared
statewide and “[b]eginning in the 2013-14 school year, the previous 38.4%
aid reduction to MPS will be reduced by 3.2 percentage points per year
until the program is fully funded by state general purpose revenue. In the
2014-15 school year the MPCP is funded 32% from a reduction in state
general aid to MPS ($61,120,000 in 2014-15) and 68% from state general
purpose revenue ($129,880,000 in 2014-15).”94 Table 4 chronicles those
changes over time.
Two other funding changes should also be noted. First, in 1999, the
program expanded to permit vouchers for summer programming. 95
Secondly, the manner in which DPI pays participating schools has come
full circle. Originally, each calendar quarter DPI cut a check for each
participating school in an amount equal to the number of participating
students multiplied by 25% of the voucher amount.96 When the program
expanded to permit religious schools, the statute changed this practice to
direct the funds to the parents by means of a restrictively endorsed check.97
So rather than one check per participating school, the state provided one
check per child, per quarter. The checks were mailed to the schools, but
91. WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (5)(a)(1990).
92. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(4)(bg). Beginning in 2015-16, the voucher amount will be
determined by a formula.
93. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(4)(bg)(3). Participating schools are also permitted to recoup
debt service costs associated with educational programming.
94. MPCP Facts and Figures for 2014-15, supra note 19.
95. 1999 Wis. Act 9, § 2109q (Oct. 29, 1999).
96. 1989 Act 336, § 228, (May 11, 1990) (codified at Wis. Stat. § 119.23(4)(1990)).
97. 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 4006m (July 29, 1995).
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made out to the parents and parents had to endorse them over to the
schools.98 This change was made in order to avoid invalidation under the
Establishment Clause as a direct payment to religious schools.99 The 2011
revisions to the law returned the procedure to the original process.100
Table 4: Changes to MPCP Provisions Concerning Program Funding
Original
Requirement

Changes and Year of Change

Voucher equals Voucher equals
equivalent per equivalent per
pupil state aid pupil state aid or
private school
operating budget
and debt service
per pupil
whichever is less
(1995)

Set maximum
Adds section to
voucher amount to specify what
$6,442 (2009).
may be
considered to
calculate
school’s
operating budget
and debt service
(2011).

MPS state aid
reduced by the
number of
participating
students.

Changed formula
for determining
proportion paid by
MPS and
proportion paid by
general revenue
funds (2009).

Requirement that
MPS pay for 45%
of voucher with
the state providing
the remainder
from general
revenue funds
(2001)
Make quarterly Payments made
payments to
directly to parents
schools based with restrictively
on enrollment endorsed checks
(1 per
child)(1995)

Set maximum
voucher to $7210
(elementary) &
$7856 (high
school) for the
2014-15
academic year)
and establishes a
formula for
voucher
increases
thereafter (2013).

Changed
formula to
eventually shift
to being fully
funded under
state’s general
purpose
revenues (2013).

Make quarterly
payments directly
to the school on
behalf of the
parent; single
payment for each
school (2011).

Added summer
school voucher
(1999)

98. Id.
99. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 618 (Wis. 1998).
100. 2011 Wis. Act 32, §§ 2541m, 2542, 2542c (July 1, 2011) (codified at WIS. STAT.
§ 119.23 (4)(c)).
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III. Current MPCP Participation
As would be anticipated given the statutory expansions reviewed in the
previous section, participation has increased steadily since the program’s
inception. The first year of the MPCP saw 7 participating schools enrolling
300 students.101 After Davis was decided in 1992, participation increased to
11 schools and a total of 594 students.102 The school year (1998-99) after
the Supreme Court’s ruling upholding the program on Establishment Clause
grounds103 saw the most dramatic increase, from 23 to 83 schools and from
1487 to 5761 students.104 During the 2010-2011 school year,105 20,996
students attended 102 participating private schools.106 Not surprisingly, with
the cap removed, the 2011-2012 school year saw the largest increase in
participation since 2006.107 As mentioned earlier, the MPCP now funds
nearly 27,000 students who attend 113 private schools.108 As the Public
Policy Forum pointed out, “[i]f MPCP were a Wisconsin public school
district, it would be the third largest in the state behind Milwaukee and
Madison districts.”109
MPCP schools vary with regard to the number of voucher students
each accepts, but the program has evolved such that the majority of schools
rely heavily on the vouchers for operational funding. Analysis of the
enrollment data for 2012-2013 reported by the Public Policy Forum,110 an
organization that tracks MPCP participation, documents that on the average
participating MPCP schools enroll 82% of their student body by means of a
voucher. That percentage increases to 87% if you examine those schools
101. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU. MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE
PROGRAM, INFORMATIONAL PAPER 28, at 9, (January, 2011).
102. Id.
103. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 618.
104. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, supra note 101.
105. For 2010-11, the MPCP still had a limitation on the number of students who could
participate (22,500), defined eligibility as 175% of the poverty level, and restricted
participating schools to those within the city’s limits. WIS. STAT. 119.23(2)(b)(2009).
106. Wis. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, MPCP Facts and Figures for 2010-2011
(November, 2013), available at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/sms_geninfo.
107. Anneliese Dickman & Jeffrey Schmidt, Research Brief: Significant Growth in
School Choice 100:1 PUBLIC POLICY FORUM 1–12 (February 2012), available at
http://publicpolicyforum.org/sites/default/files/2012voucherbrief.pdf.
108. MPCP Facts and Figures for 2014-2015, supra note 19.
109. Dickman & Schmidt, supra note 107, at 3.
110. See Milwaukee Voucher Schools 2012-2013, PUBLIC POLICY FORUM (Feb. 2013),
available at http://publicpolicyforum.org/sites/default/files/2013VoucherPoster.pdf. For a
report on the previous year’s enrollment, see Dickman & Schmidt, supra note 107, at 9.
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within Milwaukee’s city limits111 and if you omit the only two Milwaukee
schools with less than 10% voucher enrollment,112 the average MPCP
enrollment increases to 88.6%.113 Table 5 presents an analysis of schools’
enrollment with respect to the proportion admitted through the MPCP.
Table 5: Analysis of the % of MPCP Students in Participating Schools’
Total Student Population114
% of MPCP
students in total
school population

# of MPCP
participating
private
schools
Schools w/o data to 3
compute
8
0 – 9.9%
1
10 – 19.9%
2
20 – 29.9%
1
30 – 39.9%
4
40 – 49.9%
4
50 – 59.9%
3
60 – 69.9%
6
70 – 79.9%
13
80 – 89.9%
50
90 – 99.9%
18
100%
113
Total

% of total
participating
schools
2.7%

# of MPCP
participating
private schools in
city of Milwaukee
1

% of total
participating
schools in city of
Milwaukee
1.0%

7.1%
.9%
1.8%
.9%
3.5%
3.5%
2.7%
5.3%
11.5%
44.2%
15.9%
100.0%

2
1
0
1
4
4
3
5
13
50
18
102

2.0%
1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
3.9%
3.9%
2.9%
4.9%
12.7%
49.0%
17.6%
100.0%

As shown, 50 schools (44.2%) had 90–99.9% MPCP enrollment and
18 schools (15.9%) had 100% MPCP enrollment. Only 16 schools (14.2%)
had less than 50% MPCP enrollment. Figure 1 presents the same data, but
divides the schools into quintiles depending on enrollment. As this graphic
shows, nearly three-fourths of MPCP participating schools (71.7%) had
80% or greater voucher enrollment.

111. Id.
112. Id. Marquette University High School (4.6%) and Divine Savior Holy Angels
High School (8.4%).
113. See Id.
114. This table was compiled by analyzing the data reported by Public Policy Forum
(supra note 110).
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This pattern of publicly funded enrollment prompted State
Superintendent Tony Evers to remark, “This government subsidy has
protected Milwaukee private schools from the market forces that have led
to declining private enrollment statewide.”115 After reviewing the data in
the letter to the state legislature’s Joint Committee on Finance, Evers also
posed the following question: “If only one in five students enrolled in a
choice school pays tuition, then when do choice schools stop being private
schools and become something else?”116
Superintendent Evers also reported on another enrollment trend he
called “concerning,” the relative number of children with disabilities
enrolled in the MPCP schools when compared to those of MPS.117 He
reported data that children with disabilities comprised only .7% of MPCP
schools enrollments, while children with disabilities were about 19.9% of
MPS enrollment.118 Another more recent DPI document places the
proportion of children with disabilities in MPCP schools at a slightly higher
level (2%).119 In addition, the DPI reports that percentage of MPS students
with disabilities has steadily increased over the years, even though the
number of students with disabilities in the public system has remained

115. Letter from Tony Evers, Wis. State Superintendent of Pub. Instruction to the
Members of the Joint Comm. on Fin., supra note 14, at 2.
116. Id. at 5.
117. Id. at 2.
118. Id.
119. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 21.
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stable.120 In other words, MPS has lost “regular” education students to the
MPCP, but not “special” education students.
IV. Legal Challenges to the MPCP
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has heard challenges to the MPCP
twice. The first challenge, Davis v. Grover, began when then State
Superintendent Bert Grover promulgated a series of regulations plaintiffs
believed exceeded his authority under the original MPCP.121 School
administrator and civil rights groups then intervened to challenge the
constitutionality of the program.122 Interestingly, one area of contention at
the trial court level was the MPCP’s treatment of children with disabilities.
Superintendent Grover had created a rule that would have required MPCP
schools to serve children with disabilities in a manner similar to public
schools, effectively making what was then the Education for All
Handicapped Children’s Act123 applicable to the MPCP schools.124 Judge
Steingass rejected that argument125 largely deferring to a memo written by
120. Letter from Tony Evers, Wis. State Superintendent of Pub. Instruction to the
Members of the Joint Comm. on Fin., supra note 14.
121. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 464-65 (Wis. 1992).
122. Id.
123. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq.; 34
C.F.R. 300 et seq. The IDEA provides federal funds for the purpose of funding special
education and related services (20 U.S.C. §1400(d)). It is a highly prescriptive law that
mandates that states ensure that each eligible child with a disability have available a free
appropriate public education (20 U.S.C. §1412(a)). Special education is defined as “specially
designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a
disability” (20 U.S.C. §1401(29)). Related services “means transportation, and such
developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech-language
pathology and audiology services, interpreting services, psychological services, physical and
occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work services,
school nurse services designed to enable a child with a disability to receive a free
appropriate public education as described in the individualized education program of the
child, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility
services, and medical services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and
evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit
from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of disabling
conditions in children” (20 U.S.C. §1401(26)). For a full explanation of the legal
requirements for IDEA, see e.g., DIXIE SNOW HUEFNER AND CYNTHIA M. HERR, NAVIGATING
SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND POLICY (2012).
124. See Julie Underwood, Choice in Education: The Wisconsin Experience, 68 EDUC.
L. REP. 229, 237 (1991).
125. Davis v. Grover, No. 90-CV-25765 (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. 1990).
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Richard D. Komer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Office for
Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Education.126 Komer concluded that
since the participating schools were private, they could only be required to
make reasonable accommodations to enroll children with disabilities.127
Although the case advanced to the appellate court on the other issues, the
ruling with respect to children with disabilities was never appealed.128
The heart of the complaint in Davis v. Grover was its consideration of
three constitutional issues: (1) whether the bill had been enacted according
to constitutionally required procedures that prohibit the legislature from
passing “private” or “local” bills;129 (2) whether the program violated the
uniformity clause of the state constitution’s education provision;130 and
(3) whether the law comported with the public purpose doctrine.131 Judge
Steingass found the law constitutional on all three counts.132 The Court of
Appeals reversed, finding that the MPCP was a local bill in contravention
of the state constitution.133
The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Callow wrote for a
four-person majority.134 First the court determined that the MPCP, as an
educational experiment, had sufficient statewide application that it should
not be considered a local or private bill and therefore reversed the appellate
court on that issue.135
Next the court analyzed the program under the state constitution’s
education clause. That clause reads as follows:
The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district
schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such

126. Memorandum from Richard D. Komer, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Policy in the
Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Dep’t of Educ. to Ted Sanders, Under Sec’y to the Dep’t
of Education, (July 27, 1990).
127. Id. For a discussion, see Julie F. Mead, Including Students with Disabilities in
Parental Choice Programs: The Challenge of Meaningful Choice, 100 EDUC. L. REP. 463,
476 (1995).
128. See Davis v. Grover, 464 N.W. 2d 220, 222 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
129. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 18.
130. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3.
131. See State ex rel. Warren v. Rueter, 170 N.W. 2d 790 (1969).
132. Davis, supra note 128.
133. Id. at 220.
134. Justices Callow, Ceci, Day, and Steinmetz formed the majority. Chief Justice
Heffernan, and Justices Abrahamson and Bablitch dissented.
135. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 471 (Wis. 1992).
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schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children
136
between the ages of 4 and 20 years.

The court read this mandate to compel the legislature to create “district
schools,” but ruled that the private schools participating in the MPCP did
not become “district schools” merely because they received public funding.
The court reasoned that “[t]he uniformity clause clearly was intended to
assure certain minimal educational opportunities for the children of
Wisconsin.”137 The MPCP, the court reasoned “merely reflects a legislative
desire to do more than that which is constitutionally mandated” and that the
legislature’s “experimental attempts to improve that foundation in no way
denies any student the opportunity to receive the basic education in the
public school system.”138
Similarly, the court held that the MPCP satisfied the public purpose
doctrine. That doctrine is not enshrined in Wisconsin’s constitution, but the
“court has long held that public expenditures may be only for public
purposes.”139 Challengers had argued that the state did not have sufficient
control over MPCP schools to ensure that the funds adequately served a
public purpose. In this instance, the court determined that education was a
valid public purpose and that private schools could further that purpose.
The court noted that the state already set minimum standards that statutorily
defined “private school” in Wisconsin, including requirements that the
school:
(1) be organized to primarily provide private or religiousbased education;
(2) be privately controlled;
(3) provide at least 875 hours of instruction each school
year;
(4) provide a sequentially progressive curriculum of
fundamental instructions in reading, language arts,
mathematics, social studies, science, and health;
(5) not be operated or instituted for the purpose of
avoiding or circumventing compulsory school
attendance; and

136. WIS. CONST. art. X § 3.
137. Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 474.
138. Id. For a discussion of voucher programs and state constitutional provisions, see
Preston Green and Peter Moran, The State Constitutionality of Voucher Programs: Religion
Is Not the Sole Determinant, BYU EDUC. & L.J. 275 (2010).
139. Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 474.
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(6) have pupils return home not less than two months of
each year unless the institution is also licensed as a
child welfare agency.140
The court concluded that those requirements “coupled with parental
involvement suffice to ensure the public purpose is met.”141 The court also
noted that the statutory requirement for “detailed reports and evaluations”
worked to guarantee the program served a public purpose.142
Six years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court would re-examine the
MPCP and its relationship to both the Uniformity Clause and public
purpose doctrine in Jackson v. Benson.143 Jackson is best known for the
court’s analysis of the Establishment of Religion Clause issues raised by the
legislature’s removal of the requirement that MPCP schools be nonsectarian.144 In addition to upholding the law on state145 and federal
religious claims,146 Jackson also considered whether changes enacted to the
law placed it out of compliance with the other state constitutional
mandates.147 Opponents had argued that the removal of the cap on the
number of students a given school could enroll under the voucher would
allow a school to be supported entirely by public funds, thus making it a
public, not a private school. The court rejected this argument, finding the
proportion of voucher students enrolled in a school irrelevant to
determining whether it was a private school. The majority held that “mere
appropriation of public monies to a private school does not transform that
school into a district school under art. X, § 3” and that “[t]his conclusion is
not affected by the amount of public funds a private school receives.”148
Likewise, the court re-affirmed the program’s compliance with the
public purpose doctrine.149 Challengers argued that the removal of the
evaluative components of the law so weakened the accountability
provisions that the MPCP no longer sufficiently satisfied a public purpose.
140. Id. at 475, citing WIS. STAT. § 118.165 (1992).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 476.
143. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998). The court split 4-2 in reaching
its decision. Justices Steinmetz, Wilcox, Crooks, and Prosser formed the majority. Chief
Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bablitch dissented. Justice Bradley did not participate.
144. Id. at 607.
145. Id. at 623.
146. Id. at 620.
147. Id. at 607.
148. Id. at 627.
149. Id. at 630.
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The court rejected this reasoning and listed three ways the program
remained accountable to the public: (1) MPCP schools “continue to be
subject to the instruction, curriculum, and attendance regulations that
govern all private schools”; (2) the statute still required financial audits and
a further review by the Legislative Audit Bureau; and (3) “the schools
participating in the amended MPCP are also subject to the additional checks
inherent in the notion of school choice.”150
As noted in the introduction, the most recent legal challenge to the
MPCP was filed on June 7, 2011, even before the legislature enacted
expansions to the program that same year.151 That challenge renewed
concerns that the MPCP does not adequately serve students with
disabilities.152 Complainants alleged that participating private schools
actively turn away students with disabilities they could serve with minor
accommodations to existing programs153 in violation of the nondiscrimination mandates of both Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 154
and the Americans with Disabilities Act.155 They asserted that MPCP
schools are “recipients” of federal funds and therefore are directly
responsible under Section 504 for compliance, rather than as indirect
recipients of monies that flow to the state.156 Moreover, they maintained
that “the growth of the voucher program combined with the exclusion of
students with disabilities from that program has led to an increasing
concentration of students with disabilities in MPS,” effectively segregating
children with disabilities in MPS schools.157 Referencing the concerns
raised by State Superintendent Evers, they pointed to the difference
between the percentage of students with disabilities served in MPCP
schools (1.6%) and the MPS schools (19.5%).158 While the complaint takes
aim at private schools for not doing enough to accommodate enrolled
children with disabilities,159 the complaint predominantly focused on the
150. Id. at 629–630.
151. 2011 Wis. Act 32 (June 26, 2011).
152. Complaint, ACLU v. Wisconsin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 24.
153. Id. at 5.
154. 29 U.S.C. §794; 34 C.F.R. 104 et seq.
155. 42 U.S.C. §§12131–12134; 28 C.F.R. 35 et seq.
156. Complaint, ACLU v. Wisconsin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 24,
at 3.
157. Id. at 10.
158. Id.
159. Two MPCP schools are named respondents in the complaint: Messmer Preparatory
Catholic School and Concordia University School. Id. at 1.
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state legislature and its development of the program, accusing the state of
violating the federal non-discrimination acts by not taking affirmative
action to ensure the voucher program operates in a non-discriminatory
manner with respect to children with disabilities.160 They also alleged that
the Department of Public Instruction has not provided sufficient oversight
to ensure that the MPCP schools comply with their non-discrimination
obligations.161 Once again, the complaint raised the issues of whether
MPCP schools are private or public, declaring “[t]he voucher schools ought
to be treated like public schools given the nature of their funding from the
state [and] [a]s such they ought to accept IDEA-eligible students and
provide them with appropriate services, at the same rate as public
schools.”162 The complaint requested that the DOJ:
 fully investigate [the] claims [made in the complaint];
 ensure that the voucher program ceases operating in a
way the leads to segregation of Milwaukee students
with disabilities in MPS;
 ensure that DPI monitors the schools participating in
the voucher program to ensure that students with
disabilities are given equal access;
 halt the expansion of the voucher program unless and
until the segregation and discrimination issues are
remedied; and
 grant any other relief it deems just and proper.163
The Department of Justice began its investigation by requesting
information from the DPI and other respondents.164 While the private
school responses to DOJ requests are not publicly available, the DPI made
its responses to the DOJ’s inquiries public.165 Those responses sketched out
DPI’s position that the MPCP is funded with state funds only and that no
federal education dollars flow to the participating schools.166 DPI
acknowledged that some MPCP schools participate in the National School
160. Id. at 22–27.
161. Id. at 4.
162. Id. at 28.
163. Id. at 5.
164. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div. to the Wis. Dep’t of Pub.
Instruction, Aug. 17, 2011.
165. Responses of State Superintendent Tony Evers and the Wis. Dep’t of Pub.
Instruction to U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div. Letter of August 17, 2011 (Sept. 27,
2011).
166. Id.
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Lunch Program.167 The agency then explained that it does not have statutory
authority to directly oversee participating schools’ admission and treatment
of children with disabilities beyond obtaining assurances of nondiscrimination.168 As such, much of the information requested by the DOJ
was met with the same responseDPI has no authority and therefore does
not have nor collect the requested information.169
The DOJ issued its response to the investigation in a letter dated April
9, 2013.170 While the letter made no findings of fact, it detailed the federal
agency’s position that “DPI must do more to enforce the federal statutory
and regulatory requirements that govern the treatment of students with
disabilities who participate in the school choice program.”171 The letter did
not address the complaint’s assertion that schools should be bound to
additional requirements under Section 504 as direct recipients of federal
funds, nor did the letter weigh in on the private/public nature of schools that
participate. Rather it focused on the obligations of the state with regard to
administering a public program in accordance with Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.172 The DOJ concentrated it analysis on the
public nature of the voucher program and the state’s obligation under Title
II of the ADA173 to ensure that “no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. The DPI informed the DOJ that it has: (a) No staff person specifically responsible
for the participation of children with disabilities in the MPCP; (b) No policies or procedures,
letters, emails, or other correspondence that reference MPCP compliance with Section 504
or the ADA; (c) No letters, emails, or other documents or materials sent to MPCP schools
regarding access or programming for children with disabilities; (d) No data collected to track
application, enrollment, retention, outreach, disenrollment, transfer, and suspension or
expulsion of children with disabilities in MPCP schools; (e) No data to indicate the total
number of students with disabilities enrolled in each participating school or the disability
categories represented; (f) No data tracking students who enroll in the MPCP and
subsequently return to MPS or the basis for any withdrawal, either in the aggregate or
disaggregated by disability status; (g) No DPI personnel with authority to approve publicity,
outreach, or enrollment information produced by schools. (h) No monitoring activities for
MPCP schools’ compliance with Section 504 and the ADA. Responses of State
Superintendent Tony Evers, supra note 165.
170. See Letter from Anurima Bhargava et al., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Civil Rights Div.,
Educ. Opportunities Sec., to Tony Evers, State Superintendent, Wis. Dep’t. of Pub.
Instruction
(Apr.
9,
2013),
available
at
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
04_09_13_letter_to_wisconsin_dpi_0.pdf.
171. Id. at 1.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2.
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denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”174 Specifically, the
DOJ concluded that the DPI must:
(1) empower students with disabilities and their parents to make
informed decisions during the school selection process; (2) ensure that
disability status has no unlawful adverse impact on admissions
decisions, and (3) ensure that voucher schools do not discriminate
against students with disabilities enrolled in the school, either by
denying those students opportunities and benefits available to nondisabled students, or by failing to make reasonable modifications to
school policies where ADA regulations apply to DPI or participating
175
schools.

The DOJ also directed the state agency to collect accurate data on the
participation of children with disabilities, review the accuracy of marketing
materials, and ensure that no discrimination occurs.176 The DOJ letter then
listed seven (7) specific requirements for DPI compliance (See Table 6),
reminding the state that “[t]he private or religious status of individual
voucher schools does not absolve DPI of its obligation to assure that
Wisconsin’s school choice programs do not discriminate against persons
with disabilities as required under Title II.”177
The Department of Public Instruction responded to the DOJ’s
directives in a letter dated November 25, 2013.178 DPI’s letter reiterated its
response to earlier questions that it has limited statutory authority to
oversee the private schools participating in the program. 179 The letter then

174. 42 U.S.C. §12132.
175. Letter from Anurima Bhargava et al. to Tony Evers, supra note 170.
176. Id. at 3.
177. Id. Citing Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F. 3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2010)
(upholding ADA regulations requiring public entities to ensure non-discrimination when
third parties are involved in delivery of programs or benefits); Kerr v. Heather Gardens
Ass’n, No. 09-409, 2010 WL 3791484, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that a public entity
must ensure non-discrimination of third parties delivering public benefits), rev’d on other
grounds, Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York Coal. for Quality Assisted Living, 675 F.3d
149 (2d Cir. 2012); James v. Peter Pan Transit Mgmt., Inc., No. 97-747, 1999 WL 735173,
at *8-9 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 20, 1999) (holding that when a public entity contracts with a third
party, it must ensure non-discrimination under the ADA); cf, 28 C.F.R. §§35.130(b)(1)(v);
35. 130 (b)(3).
178. See Letter from Janet Jenkins, Chief Legal Counsel, Wis. Dep’t. of Pub.
Instruction, to Renee Wohlenhaus, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 25, 2013)
available at http://watchdog.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files/2014/
04/DPI-Response-dated-November-25-2013.pdf.
179. Id.
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outlined DPI’s concerns regarding DOJ’s requirements, including a request
that the DOJ provide more detail about the ways Title II has been
violated.180 The DPI also questioned whether DOJ had the authority to order
the DPI to impose additional requirements on the private voucher schools
and its own authority to comply with the directives giving the statutory
limits placed on the state agency by the state legislature.181 Table 6 provides
a comparison between each DOJ directive and DPI’s response to it. While
declaring the agency’s commitment to non-discrimination, the DPI only
promised full compliance with two of the seven directivespreparation and
dissemination of outreach materials to families and the development of
program guidance regarding the ADA for all participating private
schools.182 It is not known whether the agency abided by any of the
deadlines imposed by the letter.
Table 6: Side by Side Comparison of DPI Responses to DOJ Directives
DOJ Directive183

DPI response to Directive184

Eliminate discrimination against students
with disabilities in the MPCP and all state
voucher programs.

Requests the DOJ “tell the DPI what aspects of
DPI’s legislatively circumscribed
administration of the Choice program results in
any violation of Title II.”

Establish and publicize a complaint
procedure for those alleging disability
discrimination in the voucher program.
Provide the DOJ copies of all complaints
and their resolution by 12/15/2013 and
6/15/2014.

The DPI will comply, but is concerned that it
has only has statutory authority to address
discriminatory behavior in the admissions
process and “limited statutory authority to
sanction Choice schools” for any other
discriminatory behavior.

180. Id.
181. Id. at 2–3.
182. Id. It should be noted that to date no guidance for participating MPCP schools or
parents of enrolled children regarding the ADA has been made available on the MPCP
website.
183. See Letter from Anurima Bhargava et al., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Civil Rights Div.,
Educ. Opportunities Sec., to Tony Evers, State Superintendent, Wis. Dep’t. of Pub.
Instruction (Apr. 9, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/04_09_13_
letter_to_wisconsin_dpi_0.pdf.
184. See Letter from Janet Jenkins, Chief Legal Counsel, Wis. Dep’t. of Pub.
Instruction, to Renee Wohlenhaus, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 25, 2013)
available at http://watchdog.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files/2014/04/
DPI-Response-dated-November-25-2013.pdf.
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DOJ Directive183

DPI response to Directive184

Collect data regarding the number of
children with disabilities who apply, are
accepted, are denied (by 9/30/2013), are
suspended or expelled, and who leave each
participating voucher school (by 6/15/2014),
disaggregated by grade level and type of
disability.

The DPI will request the data, but believes it
has no statutory authority to demand it or to
sanction schools that fail to provide it. “[T]he
DPI is concerned that this requirement may
violate the principle…that the Federal
Government may not compel the States to
implement…federal regulatory programs.”

Conduct outreach to families of children
with disabilities to inform them of their
rights under program and the services
available at participating voucher schools.

The DPI will comply and make materials
available on the program’s website, but
believes it lacks the statutory authority to
require participating schools to disseminate the
materials.

Provide monitoring and oversight to ensure
that voucher schools do not engage in any
discrimination on the basis of disability
during admissions, programming,
suspension or expulsion.

The DPI will work with the DOJ to monitor
whether discrimination is occurring in the
Choice schools. “Because of the DPI’s limited
authority regarding regulation of Choice
schools and its even more limited authority to
impose any kind of sanctions against Choice
schools . . ., the DPI is concerned it lacks the
statutory authority to review, investigate, and
correct discriminatory expulsions.”

Provide mandatory ADA training to new
voucher schools and periodic training to
continuing voucher schools and provide a
copy of the all materials to the DOJ.

The DPI will request the Chicago office of the
US DOJ Office for Civil Rights provide the
training.

By 12/31/2013, develop program guidance
concerning the ADA and private school
participation in the voucher program.

The DPI will work with the DOJ to develop
the guidance.

V. Revisiting the Legal Issues
The complaint brought by the ACLU/DRW and others marks the third
significant challenge to the MPCP. Not surprisingly, like each of the
previous disputes, it coincides with a major expansion of the program.185
185. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Wis. 1992) followed the establishment of
Milwaukee’s voucher program. Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 835, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.
1998) followed the expansion of the program to include religious schools and increase the
number of students who could participate, and the latest challenge filed by the ACLU
coincided with the removal of the participation cap, among other changes.
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All three challenges call into question what it means to be a “private”
school and how that differs from a “public” school. Furthermore, even
though the ACLU/DRW complaint did not explicitly attempt to renew the
previous constitutional claims considered in both Davis and Jackson, by
arguing that the schools are “private in name only” and should be
considered “public” schools for the purposes of their service to children
with disabilities, they effectively invited re-analysis of those claims.
A. Disability Discrimination
Given the focus of the ACLU/DRW complaint, it is necessary to
address the allegation of disability discrimination in the MPCP first. Both
Section 504 and the ADA are federal laws that prohibit discrimination on
the basis of disability, though Section 504’s reach is limited to recipients of
federal financial assistance.186 The state, as a recipient of federal funds,
must ensure compliance with Section 504. Any school that receives federal
funds would likewise fall directly under the ambit of Section 504. In
addition, MPCP private schools are indirectly bound by Section 504
because of their relationship to a recipient (the state) through a state
operated program.187 ADA’s Title II,188 which applies to “public entities,”189
also mandates the state ensure non-discrimination on the basis of disability
in all its programs and activities.190 Private schools must directly comply
186. Section 504 reads: “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
United States, . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” (29 U.S.C. § 794(a)). The
purpose of the ADA is: “(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide clear,
strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and (4) to
invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities” (42 U.S.C. §12101).
187. Supra notes 170–177 and accompanying text.
188. 42 U.S.C. §§12131–12134; 28 C.F.R. 35 et seq.
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2012) (defining “public entity” as “(A) any State or local
government; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of
a State or States or local government; and (C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation,
and any commuter authority (as defined in section 24102(4) of Title 49).”).
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) (noting that “no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied
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with Title III of the ADA,191 which addresses the need for public
accommodations to be offered on an equitable basis.192 In addition, similar
to Section 504’s indirect reach, private schools that participate in the MPCP
(a state program) fall indirectly under the state’s Title II obligations. Both
laws require that qualified individuals with disabilities be reasonably
accommodated in order to avoid discrimination.193 Reasonable
accommodations or modifications are measures taken to mitigate the effects
of a disability such that the person can reasonably participate in and benefit
from the activity.194
The ACLU/DRW complaint makes allegations against both some
participating schools and the state.195 The easier of the two claims to
analyze is the allegation that the private participating schools have not
admitted students with disabilities, discouraged their applications, or have
failed to provide reasonable accommodations to them once enrolled. If
proven, these claims appear to be clear violations of the private schools’
obligations under Section 504 and the ADA to enroll and serve those
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.”).
191. 42 U.S.C. §§12181-12189 (2012); 34 C.F.R. 36 et seq.; See specifically 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12181 (2012) (“The following private entities are considered public accommodations for
purposes of [Title III], . . . (J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or
postgraduate private school, or other place of education.”).
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012) (“No individual shall be discriminated against on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”).
193. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2014) (“A public entity shall make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to
avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that
making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or
activity.”); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a) (2014) (“A public accommodation shall make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when the modifications are necessary to
afford goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals
with disabilities, unless the public accommodation can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations.”); 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(a) (2014) (“A recipient
that provides private elementary or secondary education may not, on the basis of handicap,
exclude a qualified handicapped person if the person can, with minor adjustments, be
provided an appropriate education, as defined in § 104.33(b)(1), within that recipient’s
program or activity.”).
194. Id. See generally CTL ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland School Dist., 743 F.3d 524
(7th Cir. 2014); Doe v. Woodford County Bd. of Educ., 213 F.3d 921 (6th Cir. 2000); Mark
H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2010).
195. See Complaint, ACLU v. Wisconsin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 24.
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students who can be reasonably accommodated in existing programs.196
Interestingly, the DOJ letter did not directly address these claims. 197 These
allegations, however, are not unlike claims in other choice contexts where
incidents of “counseling out” have been documented in charter schools,
statewide open enrollment, and magnet school settings.198 Similar
conclusions have put operators of those choice programs on notice that
discrimination against children with disabilities in choice contexts must be
corrected. In fact, administrative guidance and rulings around those choice
environments have yielded four reasonably clear directives:199
1. All publicly funded choice programs must be
accessible to children with disabilities.200
2. Parents and children can not be required to
waive needed services in order to participate
in the choice program.201
3. A student’s right to “free appropriate public
education” must be preserved in any choice
program delivered in public schools.202
4. States need to determine which entity (the
sending district, receiving school or district, a
combination, or some other entity) will serve
as the responsible “local education agency”
for purposes of IDEA.203

196.
197.
198.

Supra notes 186–194 and accompanying text.
Supra note 170.
See Julie F. Mead, How Legislation and Litigation Shape School Choice, in
EXPLORING THE SCHOOL CHOICE UNIVERSE: EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 39–64, at 52
(Gary Miron, et al. eds., 2012).
199. Id.
200. See Letter to Lunar, 17 IDELR 834 (OSEP 1991); Letter to Evans, 17 IDELR 836
(OSEP 1991); Letter to Bina, 18 IDELR 582 (OSEP 1991); Letter to Bocketti, 32 IDELR
225 (OCR 1999); Letter to Gloecker, 33 IDELR 222 (OSEP 2000).
201. Fallbrook Union Elementary School District, 16 IDELR 754 (OCR 1990); San
Francisco Unified School District, 16 IDELR 824 (OCR 1990); Chattanooga Public School
District, 20 IDELR 999 (OCR 1993).
202. Letter to Lunar, 17 IDELR 834 (OSEP 1991); Letter to Evans, 17 IDELR 836
(OSEP 1991); Letter to Bina, 18 IDELR 582 (OSEP 1991); Letter to Bocketti, 32 IDELR
225 (OCR 1999); Letter to Gloecker, 33 IDELR 222 (OSEP 2000).
203. San Francisco Unified School District, 16 IDELR 824 (OCR 1990); Letter to
Bocketti, 32 IDELR 225 (OCR 1999); Letter to Gloecker, 33 IDELR 222 (OSEP 2000).
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Of course, these directives involve public school choice options,
whereas the MPCP program is a publicly funded private school program.
This distinction requires a bifurcated examination when considering
whether the program operates in nondiscriminatory manner. The direct
actions of participating private schools are important, but equally if not
more important is the state’s obligation to ensure that each program or
benefit it establishes is nondiscriminatory both on its face and as
implemented. In this instance, the state legislature must ensure that the
public voucher program it enacts is accessible to children with disabilities
and the DPI, as the agency responsible for overseeing the program, must
ensure that that public voucher programs are implemented in a
nondiscriminatory manner. These are the allegations the DOJ addressed in
its post-investigation letter.204
DPI’s November 2013 response to DOJ directives seems to neglect
these important distinctions. Even if the schools that participate in the
MPCP are private, the voucher program is not. The MPCP is a public
program, which requires the state to assure non-discrimination in its
operation.205 As the DOJ explained, “the State cannot, by delegating the
education function to private voucher schools, place MPCP students beyond
the reach of the federal laws that require Wisconsin to eliminate disability
discrimination in its administration of public programs.”206 The DPI
objected to the DOJ’s analysis, contending that the federal agency was
likening the MPCP to contracted services.207 According to the DPI, that
characterization is in error because the state does not contract with the
schools per se, but rather merely makes the vouchers available to parents
who decide where to use them.208 As the agency, concluded, “[a]bsent the
Choice program, neither the State nor the DPI would provide such
assistance.”209
Still, while the form of contract may differ from those defining the
relationships in the cases cited by the DOJ,210 it seems disingenuous to
argue that DPI has not entered into a contractual relationship with the
private schools that participate in the program. “The requisite elements of a
204. Letter from Anurima Bhargava et al. to Tony Evers, supra note 170.
205. 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (2014) (“[T]his part applies to all services, programs, and
activities provided or made available by public entities.”) (emphasis added).
206. Letter from Anurima Bhargava et al. to Tony Evers, supra note 170, at 2.
207. Letter from Janet Jenkins to Renee Wohlenhaus, supra note 178, at 2.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Supra note 177.
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contract include an offer and an acceptance, consideration, and mutual
assent to terms . . . .”211 The state established a program inviting the
participation of private schools (offer) and providing voucher funds
(consideration). The funds are sent to the schools, not to parents. In
exchange for the voucher funds, the schools agree to provide educational
services to eligible students (acceptance and mutual assent). Moreover, the
form completed by a private school to participate in the program includes
the following language under the heading “Agreement/Signatures”:
The Private School agrees that compliance with all the requirements in
Wis. Stat. §§ 118.60 and/or 119.23 and Administrative Code PI 35
constitutes a condition of receipt of funds under the above-referenced
program, and that this notice of intent to participate is binding upon the
school, its successors, transferees and assignees for the period during
which the school is a participant in the program. The school assures that
all contractors, subcontractors, subgrantees, and others with whom it
arranges to provide services or benefits to its students in connection with
this program are not in violation of the stated statutes, regulations,
guidelines, and standards. In the event of failure to comply with PSCP
[Private School Choice Program] requirements, the school understands
212
that its participation in the program can be terminated.

Even if one accepts DPI’s contention that the relationship it has with private
schools participating in the public voucher program is not technically a
contract, it is apparent that DPI enters into a binding agreement with each
private school that chooses to participate in the program.
ADA regulations make clear that public entities, including states,213
must ensure that “all services, programs, and activities provided or made
available by public entities”214 avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability even when the benefit is made available “through contractual,
licensing, or other arrangements.”215 The MPCP and other voucher
211. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 1 (West 2014).
212. Form, Wis. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, Private Schools Choice Programs (PSCP)
Notice of School’s Intent to Participate, 2015–16 School Year (emphasis added), available
at http://dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/
imce/forms/doc/fpcp-109.doc.
213. Supra note 189.
214. 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (2014).
215. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) (2014) (emphasis added); Section 504 regulations
similarly mandate that: “A recipient may not, directly or through contractual or other
arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of administration (i) that have the effect of
subjecting qualified handicapped persons to discrimination on the basis of handicap, (ii) that
have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the
objectives of the recipient's program or activity with respect to handicapped persons, or (iii)
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programs operated by the state are clearly public benefits made available to
individuals through “contractual . . . or other arrangements” with the private
schools that elect to take advantage of public funding that follows when the
schools determine to participate in the program.
Moreover, the state has an obligation to “make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications
are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the
public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.”216 The
data collection and information dissemination required by the DOJ seems a
modest set of directives unlikely to “fundamentally alter the nature of the”
publicly funded private school voucher programs it operates217 and which
are “necessary to avoid discrimination” in the voucher program. Whether or
not the state legislature has vested the DPI with the authority to oversee the
MPCP’s inclusion of children with disabilities, the state must satisfy the
obligations set for every public entity under the ADA.
The state’s current construction of the program has predictably218
resulted in the concentration of children with disabilities in the public
system and has relieved the private schools against which public schools
compete from serving a similar population. Even if one accepts for the sake
of argument that the DPI has vastly under-estimated the number of children
with disabilities and that the actual percentage is between 7.5% and
14.6%,219 it is beyond argument that the students with disabilities that
that perpetuate the discrimination of another recipient if both recipients are subject to
common administrative control or are agencies of the same State.” 34 C.F.R.
§104.4(b)(vii)(4)(2014).
216. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2014).
217. In fact, the original version of the MPCP included a requirement that the state
superintendent annually submit to the legislature “a report comparing the academic
achievement, daily attendance record, percentage of dropouts, percentage of pupils
suspended and expelled and parental involvement activities of pupils attending a private
school under this section and pupils enrolled in the school district operating under this
chapter.” WIS. STAT. §119.23 (5)(d) (1990). This requirement, since repealed by the
legislature, involves data quite similar to that requested by the DOJ. 1995 Wis. Act 27,
§4007m (July 28, 1995).
218. See, e.g., Julie K. Underwood, Choice Is Not a Panacea, 71 EDUC. L. REP. 599,
607 (1992) (“If a voucher program does not take this into consideration, two things will
happen. First, the schools will become segregated in that few handicapped or at-risk students
will be served in the private Choice schools. Secondly, the costs for the resident public
school district will increase as the children in need of expensive programs remain in the
public schools.”).
219. Patrick J. Wolf, John F. Witte, & David Fleming, REPORT 35: SPECIAL EDUCATION
AND THE MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM, SCHOOL CHOICE DEMONSTRATION
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require additional programming in order to succeed, including children with
the most severe needs requiring the costliest special education services, are
foreclosed from participation in a public program, the MPCP.220 As such, a
reasonable conclusion is that the state of Wisconsin has conditioned a
public benefit on disability status for more than 20 years without ever
taking active steps to ensure its non-discrimination obligations under the
law.
In fact, the only form of non-discrimination explicitly incorporated in
the statute is compliance with “42 U.S.C. 2000d”221 or Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 which mandates that no one on the basis of “race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”222 The MPCP regulations likewise
make no mention of disabilities or avoiding disability discrimination.223 A
“frequently asked questions” document does address the question of
whether a private school is “required to enroll a child with special needs in

PROJECT, at i (2012). Of note, there are two problems with these estimates. First, they are
just that—estimates—while the DPI figures are based on actual numbers of students with
Individualized Education Programs (IEPs) found eligible under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1414
(2012). Secondly, the increased estimates are based on estimates of children with disabilities
made by private school administrators and parents. As such, they include all children who
have a disability, not just those whose disabilities are such that special education is needed in
order for an appropriate education to result. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012) (noting the
standard for eligibility under IDEA); 34 C.F.R. § 300.9 (2014). In essence, every public
school has three types of children with disabilities: (category 1) those children with some
mental or physical impairment that may limit, but does not substantially limit any major life
activity; (category 2) those children with some mental or physical impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity and makes them eligible for protection from
discrimination under Section 504 (29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j) (2014)) and
the ADA (42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134 (2012); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2014)); and (category 3)
those children with some mental or physical impairment that adversely affects educational
performance such that special education is needed, making them eligible under the IDEA (20
U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.9 (2014)). The estimates of 7.5–14.6%
children with disabilities in MPCP schools uses an estimation that combines all three
categories, while the MPS figure of 19.5% children with disabilities is comprised only of
those children eligible under IDEA (category 3).
220. Recall that private schools need not provide any special education and related
services and only need to make reasonable accommodations to existing programs. See supra
notes 191–194 and accompanying text.
221. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)(4) (2014).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
223. WIS. ADMIN. CODE PI ch. 35 (2014).
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the Choice program, and to provide the child with whatever services are
required to allow the child to learn,”224 providing the response that:
A private school may not discriminate against a child with special
educational needs during the admissions process for the Choice
program. However, as a private school, a Choice school is required to
offer only those services to assist students with special needs that it can
provide with minor adjustments. Parents should contact the Choice
school during the admission process about the services the school is able
to provide for their child. Parents should also contact the school district
in which the private school is located for more information on the
services the school district provides to children with special needs who
are enrolled in the public schools and the lesser services that the school
district provides children with special needs who are enrolled in private
225
schools.

Participating schools are also asked to sign a form acknowledging receipt of
a list of student rights.226 As explained in the cover letter accompanying the
form, the document
contains an acknowledgement at the bottom by the [private school’s]
choice administrator that the Department of Public Instruction (DPI) has
227
advised you of Judge Steingass’ ruling in 1990 of certain individual
rights applicable within MPCP schools. It was agreed to at the
Legislature’s Joint Committee on Administrative Rules meeting held

224. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 22.
225. Id. The last part of the answer provided refers to the “equitable participation”
provision of the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.130–144. Those
provisions require the “local educational agency” in which the private school is located to
provide services to children with disabilities enrolled by their parents in those schools. The
IDEA requires a proportional amount of federal funds to be spent on students in private
schools, though children and their parents do not have an entitlement to the same level or
types of services they would if they remained enrolled in a public school. See U.S. Dep’t.of
Educ., Office of Special Educ. Programs, IDEA Regulations: Children Enrolled by Their
Parents in Private Schools, IDEA.ed.gov, http://idea.ed.gov/explore/view/p/%2Croot%2C
dynamic%2CTopicalBrief%2C5%2C (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
226. Letter from Tony Evers, State Superintendent, Wis. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, to
Individuals and Organizations Interested in Participating in the Private School Choice
Programs (PSCP) (Nov. 18, 2013), available at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/
imce/sms/pdf/pscp_ltr_stdnt_rights.pdf.
227. Recall that Judge Susan R. Steingass presided over the Dane County Circuit Court
when it heard the first challenge to the MPCP in Davis v. Grover, No. 90-CV-25765 (Dane
Cty. Cir. Ct. 1990). Judge Steingass’ opinion is the only one to address the issue of special
education in voucher schools, rejecting a regulation that would have required voucher
schools to fully implement federal special education law. Supra notes 121-28 and
accompanying text.
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July 30, 1998, that in exchange for the DPI’s removal of the student
rights list from the administrative rule, the [private school’s] choice
228
administrator would sign the enclosed letter of acknowledgement.

That list includes a notice about Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,229
but nothing regarding the Americans with Disabilities Act and expressly
states that the letter “is not to be construed as an agreement between DPI
and the school or as an admission that the student rights provisions attached
hereto apply to private schools participating in the choice program.”230
Accordingly, the state legislature has elected not to address disability
discrimination in the statute neither at its inception nor through twenty
subsequent revisions and in addition has purposefully acted to prohibit the
DPI from doing so by regulation.231 In essence, the state has failed as a
design principle to address the treatment of children with disabilities in the
MPCP, resulting in the voucher benefit being made available on an unequal
basis.232

228. Letter from Tony Evers to Individuals and Organizations Interested in
Participating in the Private School Choice Programs (PSCP), supra note 226.
229. Id. (“Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 794 et.
seq., which prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap in programs and activities. To
comply with Section 504, the Department of Public Instruction must assure that no qualified
handicapped persons are excluded from its programs; and must assure that all handicapped
students in funded placements have opportunity for a free appropriate education.”).
230. Id.
231. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine whether or not the legislature’s
omission of provisions addressing students with disabilities in the MPCP and its active role
taken in ensuring that the regulations likewise omit any rule outlining participating private
schools’ obligations demonstrates intent to discriminate on the basis of disability.
232. ADA regulations make clear that: “A public entity, in providing any aid, benefit,
or service, may not, directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on the
basis of disability -- (i) Deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to
participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service; (ii) Afford a qualified individual
with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service
that is not equal to that afforded others; (iii) Provide a qualified individual with a disability
with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to
obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as
that provided to others” (28 C.F.R. 35.130(b)(1)) (emphasis added). Similarly, Section 504
dictates that: “In providing health, welfare, or other social services or benefits, a recipient
may not, on the basis of handicap: (1) Deny a qualified handicapped person these benefits or
services; (2) Afford a qualified handicapped person an opportunity to receive benefits or
services that is not equal to that offered nonhandicapped persons; (3) Provide a qualified
handicapped person with benefits or services that are not as effective (as defined in
104.4(b)) as the benefits or services provided to others; (4) Provide benefits or services in a
manner that limits or has the effect of limiting the participation of qualified handicapped
persons” (34 C.F.R. 104.52)(emphasis added).
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In fact, it could be argued that DOJ’s directives do not go far enough
to ensure that children with disabilities may participate in the public
program the state has created. The requirements sketched out in the DOJ
letter would only require the addition of a complaint procedure,
distribution of information to parents, and data collection by the state
agency.233 DOJ’s letter does not address the underlying structure of the
program or the barriers to voucher program participation facing children
with disabilities.234 In this case, the state designed the MPCP235 with the
full knowledge that children with disabilities encounter substantive
differences should they and their parents wish to avail themselves of the
public voucher benefit, even if no private school actively engages in
discriminatory behavior.236 Private schools simply do not offer the
services many children with disabilities require in order to learn and only
need to offer accommodations accomplished through “minor adjustments”
to existing programs.237 While it is true that the initial enactment of the
MPCP predated the ADA, 238 the state has always been fully bound by
similar obligations under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 239 Even
so, the state has never addressed how the MPCP would be accessible to all
children regardless of disability, relying always on the private
school/public school distinction and the differential obligations each has
under federal disability law 240 as the justification for why students with
233. Letter from Anurima Bhargava et al. to Tony Evers,, supra note 170, at 2.
234. Id.
235. The state also designed the two subsequent voucher programs operating in Racine
and statewide. See supra note 11.
236. Davis v. Grover, No. 90-CV-25765 (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. 1990).
237. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 22.
238. The MPCP became effective on May 11, 1990 (1989 WISCONSIN ACT 336, § 228
(MAY 11, 1990). The Dane County Circuit Court issued the first ruling in Davis v. Grover on
August 10, 1990 (Davis v. Grover, 464 N.W.2d 220, at n.1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990)), only 15
days after the ADA was signed into law on July 26, 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-336). However,
at the time of both the enactment and the initial legal challenge against the MPCP, Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 applied and likewise bound the state to ensure that all
its benefits were available to individuals with disabilities on a nondiscriminatory basis. See
also Julie F. Mead, Including Students With Disabilities In Parental Choice Programs: The
Challenge Of Meaningful Choice, 100 EDUC. L. REP. 463, 482 (1995) (“Section 504 has
been determined not to apply directly to the private schools, but indirectly through the SEA.
Still, the state and all its agencies are fully bound by Section 504 and its prohibition against
discrimination. . . . The state may not, in light of Section 504, enact a program which it
knows will result in discrimination).
239. Davis v. Grover, No. 90-CV-25765 (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. 1990).
240. Contrast the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), (20 U.S.C.
§ 1400 et seq.; 34 C.F.R. 300 et seq.), with Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
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disabilities who required special education and related services could not
access the program.241
That rationale, however, neglects the power of the state to create a
program and assumes there is nothing the state legislature could do to make
the program more equitably accessible to children with disabilities. In truth,
the state legislature could enact provisions to ensure that children with
disabilities do not have to effectively waive needed special services in order
to exercise a voucher and thereby participate in a state offered public
benefit. For example, the legislature could make delivery of special
education and related services a condition of private school participation or
require an existing educational agency (e.g., the Cooperative Educational
Service Agency242 that services that jurisdiction) to provide special
education services for affected students. There may be other solutions. It is
disingenuous, however, to suggest that the state is powerless to address
special education needs in a discretionary voucher program of its own
design. “Just as the state legislatures in the 1960s could not establish
programs to provide public subsidies to private schools that discriminated
on the basis of race and then claim that they had taken no part in the
discrimination,243 so, too, the Wisconsin legislature cannot enact a program
that by design provides no or very limited access to children with
disabilities and claim it carries no responsibility for their exclusion.”244 For
the MPCP to be operated in an equitable fashion, Wisconsin, whether
(42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134; 28 C.F.R. 35 et seq. In general, under the IDEA public schools
must provide whatever special education and related services an eligible child with a
disability needs to receive a free appropriate public education (regardless of cost), while
private schools need only make reasonable accommodations to existing programming for
any child with a disability. For a full explanation of the IDEA’s legal requirements, see
DIXIE SNOW HUEFNER AND CYNTHIA M. HERR, NAVIGATING SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND
POLICY (2012).
241. Davis v. Grover, No. 90-CV-25765 (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. 1990).
242. See WIS. STAT. § 116.01 (2010) (“The cooperative educational service agencies
are designed to serve educational needs in all areas of Wisconsin by serving as a link both
between school districts and between school districts and the state. Cooperative educational
service agencies may provide leadership, coordination, and education services to school
districts, University of Wisconsin System institutions, and technical colleges. Cooperative
educational service agencies may facilitate communication and cooperation among all
public, private, and tribal schools, and all public and private agencies and organizations, that
provide services to pupils.”); see also Wis. Cooperative Educ. Service Agencies (CESAs),
http://www.cesawi.org/ (noting that there are twelve (12) cooperative educational service
agencies (CESAs) in the state of Wisconsin).
243. See e.g., Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 377 U.S. 218, 232
(1964).
244. Mead, supra note 127, at 482–83.
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through the legislature or the DPI, must do more to ensure that children
with disabilities have substantive access to the voucher program.
B. Education Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution
Interestingly, the limitations on the participation of children with
disabilities in the MPCP may also have implications for renewed charges
under the Wisconsin Constitution. As discussed earlier, the Education
Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution requires that the legislature provide a
system of “district schools . . . as nearly uniform as practicable.”245
However, the argument that voucher funding has transformed private
schools into a new form of “district” school that was rejected in both Davis
and Jackson is not likely to fare any better in 2015. The contemporary legal
question would not be whether the MPCP schools are sufficiently like
public schools, but rather whether the state’s commitment to and substantial
expansion of the MPCP have compromised the state’s ability to fulfill its
primary constitutional obligation to establish and fund district schools such
that they are as “nearly uniform as practicable.” To paraphrase the Davis
court: Does the state’s expansion and funding of the MPCP result in
deprivations to MPS and other public school districts such that the
legislature effectively denies students “the opportunity to receive the basic
education in the public school system”?246 Or put it another way, at what
point does the state’s funding of private education subvert its constitutional
obligation to provide adequately for public education?
In Vincent v. Voight, the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that the
state’s children enjoy a fundamental right to an education.247 As the Court
explained:
We further hold that Wisconsin students have a fundamental right to an
equal opportunity for a sound basic education. An equal opportunity for
a sound basic education is one that will equip students for their roles as
citizens and enable them to succeed economically and personally. The
legislature has articulated a standard for equal opportunity for a sound
basic education in Wis. Stat. §§ 118.30(lg)(a) and 121.02(L) (1997-98)
as the opportunity for students to be proficient in mathematics, science,
reading and writing, geography, and history, and for them to receive
instruction in the arts and music, vocational training, social sciences,

245.
246.
247.

WISC. CONST., art. X, § 3.
Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 474 (Wis. 1992).
Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2000).
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health, physical education and foreign language, in accordance with
their age and aptitude. An equal opportunity for a sound basic education
acknowledges that students and districts are not fungible and takes into
account districts with disproportionate numbers of disabled students,
economically disadvantaged students, and students with limited English
248
language skills.

Accordingly, in addition to establishing the fundamentality of the right to
an education, the Vincent Court set a standard to determine whether the
legislature has met its obligation under the Education Clause. To meet the
standard, the state must provide: (1) opportunity for proficiency in the core
subjects of mathematics, science, reading and writing, geography, and
history; (2) opportunity for instruction in the non-core subjects of art and
music, vocational training, social sciences, health, physical education and
foreign language; and (3) sufficient resources to address the educational
needs of special student populations.249
The expansion of the MPCP and the addition of voucher programs in
Racine and statewide250 coincide with deep budget cuts to state funding for
public school districts. The legislature cut a total of $792 million of state
aid to school districts and also reduced local districts’ taxing authority by
$1.6 billion over a two-year period.251 In fact, a recent analysis
demonstrates that the state legislature now spends 15.3% less on support to
local school districts when comparing fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2008.
252
This decrease amounts to $1038 less state support per pupil.253 As a
result of reduced resources, school districts cut 2,312 teaching positions in
public schools across the state for 2011-2012 alone.254
248.
249.

Id. at 396.
Id.; see also WILLIAM MATHIS, RESEARCH-BASED OPTIONS FOR EDUCATION
POLICYMAKING: EFFECTIVE SCHOOL EXPENDITURES, 3 NAT’L EDUC. POLICY CTR. (Feb.
2013), http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/pb-options-6-moneymatters.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,
2013) (estimating that “[e]conomically disadvantaged children need approximately 40%100% more funding per child. English language learners need 76% to 118% more.”).
250. Supra note 11.
251. 2011 Wis. Act 32, § 2539 (June 30, 2011); see also James Shaw & Carolyn
Kelley, Making Matters Worse: the Impact of Reducing State Funding and Expanding
School Choice on Student Poverty and Achievement Gaps in Wisconsin, Paper presented to
the Am. Educ. Research Ass’n. (2013).
252. Michael Leachman & Chris Mai, Most States Funding Schools Less Than Before
the Recession, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Sept. 12, 2013),
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=4011.
253. Id.
254. Dep’t. of Pub. Instruction, Official Report Shows Cuts to School Staff for 20112012 school year, (Apr. 18, 2012), available at http://news.dpi.wi.gov/sites/
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An analysis of the effects of the 2011 budget cuts details the
differential effects of the enacted changes to the school finance system.255
The report compares the effects of the cuts between high poverty districts
and low poverty districts, finding that those districts with concentrations of
poverty received deeper cuts than did districts with low poverty.256 Not
surprisingly, those districts saw the greatest staff reductions.257 As the
authors concluded:
Analysis of the fiscal impact of state budget cuts on high and lowpoverty districts suggests that a simple reduction in the state budget has
a significant adverse impact on vertical equity, as the highest need
students, teachers, districts and taxpayers bear the largest share of the
cuts. The fiscal burdens of a weak economy tend to adversely impact
high poverty districts to begin with, but these effects are compounded by
increases in tax burden in the highest poverty districts. Policies that
promote choice often target the same high-poverty districts and further
exacerbate resource reductions to support the education of the state’s
258
neediest children.

Even before the 2011 budget cuts, a study of the state’s school finance
system concluded “there is sufficient evidence such that a judge could find
that the finance system is unconstitutional with respect to its non-core
obligations259 . . . that revenue controls (along with insufficient categorical
aid) cause this problem in the non-core areas.”260 Moreover, the study
concluded that school districts, like Milwaukee, with concentrations of the
student subgroups of “disabled students, economically disadvantaged
students, and students with limited English language skills” identified by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Vincent, had not been provided with

default/files/imce/ eis/pdf/dpinr2012_58%20Annual%20Staff%20Report%20release.pdf.
255. Shaw & Kelley, supra note 251.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.; see also SCOTT WITTKOPF, FORWARD INSTITUTE, WISCONSIN BUDGET POLICY
AND POVERTY IN EDUCATION: A STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF SCHOOL FUNDING ON
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (May 2013), http://forwardinstitute.files.wordpress.com/
2013/05/wisconsin-budget-policy-and-poverty-in-education-2013.pdf.
259. See Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2000) (listing non-core
subjects as “arts and music, vocational training, social sciences, health, physical education
and foreign language”).
260. Mark A. Paige, The Funding of Public Schools in Wisconsin: Applying the
Vincent Standard to Assess the Finance System's Constitutionality, at x-xi (2011)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with Memorial
Library, University of Wisconsin-Madison).
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sufficient resources to meet the instructional needs of these special
populations.261
These analyses suggest that expansions to the voucher program262 in
tandem with severe budget cuts may provide the evidence needed to argue
that the voucher program violates the state constitution’s Education Clause
because financial support for the program has undercut adequate funding
for the constitutionally mandated support of a system of district schools as
nearly uniform as practicable.
The concentration of children with disabilities in the public system
may likewise weigh in any uniformity calculus. If the MPCP does not serve
comparable numbers and types of children with disabilities thus resulting in
the effective segregation of children with disabilities in the public system,
has the state constructively structured a district (MPS) that is no longer
uniform in comparison to other districts? Recall that more than 19% of the
MPS student population has been identified as requiring special education
and related services.263 One would expect the incidence of children with
disabilities to be approximately 12% of the student population.264 As
recognized by the Vincent Court, high concentrations of children with
disabilities will likely compromise the ability of local taxpayers to fund the
education of children in the districts that serve them.265 First, districts have
to fund the costs of special education and related services regardless of the
expense.266 Although federal dollars flow through to school districts under
the IDEA, federal funds only support about 16% of the excess costs
associated with special programming.267 The state also provides some
261. Id.
262. Supra Parts II & III.
263. Letter from Tony Evers, Wis. State Superintendent of Pub. Instruction to the
Members of the Joint Comm. on Fin., supra note 14.
264. See e.g., Latest U.S. Disability Statistics and Facts (July 26, 2011), available at
http://www.disabled-world.com/disability/statistics/census-figures.php.
265. Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2000).
266. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A); see also Cedar Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S.
66, 77–78 (1999) (discussing the IDEA and cost); see also Letter from Nat’l. School Boards
Ass’n. to U.S. H.R. Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human Services (July 24, 2013),
available at http://www.nsba.org/sites/default/files/reports/07.24.2013%20-%20FY14%20
Labor%20HHS%20Ed%20Approps%20bill_0.pdf.
267. Nat’l School Boards Ass’n, Issue Brief: Federal Funding for Education, at 2 (Feb.
2014) available at http://www.nsba.org/Advocacy/Key-Issues/FederalFunding/NSBA-IssueBrief-Federal-Funding-for-Education.pdf) (noting that Congress has never appropriated
funds commensurate with the level authorized by the IDEA. Recent estimates put the
proportion at less than 16% of the costs of funding the special education and related services
required by the IDEA.); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(2)(B)(ii)(2004)(authorizing Congress
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categorical funds for the same purpose,268 but reimburses school districts
for less than 30% of the costs.269 Local school districts, then, must make up
any of the costs not borne by state and federal funding and bear the
predominant responsibility for funding special education. As such, the
struggle to adequately fund special programming may compromise the
efficacy of those programs and make it more difficult for MPS to meet its
obligations to provide each child with a disability a free appropriate public
education as required by the IDEA.270 Likewise, the education of children
without disabilities may be compromised by the necessity to divert general
funds to meet the costly needs of the special education programming. 271
Consequently, a school district with a high concentration of children with
disabilities—made so because a voucher program has produced a student
population that does not reflect expected proportions of children with
disabilities—is hobbled by the legislature’s design and support of the
MPCP. Undoubtedly, that struggle will negatively affect the “the character
of instruction . . . [and] the training that these schools should give to the
future citizens of Wisconsin”272 rendering it no longer uniform as required
by Wisconsin’s Education Clause.
C. Public Purpose Doctrine
Similarly, re-analysis of the MPCP under the public purpose doctrine
raises some interesting questions. Recall that the Jackson Court determined
that MPCP satisfied the public purpose doctrine because participating
private schools are subject to standards set by statute, the MPCP requires
to appropriate 40% of “the average per-pupil expenditure in public elementary and schools
in the United States.”).
268. WIS. STAT. Ch. 121; see also Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Informational
Paper 24: State Aid to School Districts (Jan. 2013) available at http://legis.
wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications/Informational-Papers/Documents/2013/24State%20Aid%20to
%20School%20Districts.pdf (discussing Wisconsin’s school finance system).
269. See Wisc. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, Special Education and School-Age Parents
Aid, available at http://sfs.dpi.wi.gov/sfs_speced (reporting that the Wisconsin Department
of Public Instruction will reimburse school districts 27.47% of special education costs for
2012–2013 and 26.5% of special education costs for 2013–2014).
270. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (2012).
271. See Letter from Letter from Nat’l. School Boards Ass’n. to U.S. H.R. Subcomm.
on Labor, Health & Human Services, supra note 266.
272. See Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 409 (Wis. 2000) (quoting an earlier
Wisconsin Supreme Court decision that determined that uniformity must be judged by the
“character of instruction”, State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 289 (1928)).
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financial audits and a further review by the Legislative Audit Bureau and
program is “subject to the additional checks inherent in the notion of school
choice.”273 The current MPCP has a much broader scope and participation
than the program analyzed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1992274 or
1998,275 but the state has also enacted provisions strengthening the
oversight of the program, largely through increasing the requirements
private schools have to satisfy as a condition for participation in the
program.276 State law definitions of private school remain unchanged,277 but
participating schools must satisfy additional requirements regarding
curriculum, assessment and discipline.278 These facts suggest that a court
may find that the program continues to satisfy the public purpose doctrine if
the public purpose served is broadly described as “education.”
However, there have been changes that a court may find persuasive in
support of the opposite conclusion. We now have research to suggest that
parental choices do not necessarily coincide with better educational
environments,279 and that the “rational market” is more myth than reality, 280
undercutting the presumption that choice serves accountability. Moreover,
elements of the statute directing requirements for program evaluation the
Davis and Jackson Courts referenced as evidence that the program served a
public purpose281 have since been repealed.282 In addition, accountability
demands on public education have increased substantially since the last
time the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the issue. The demands of
the federal No Child Left Behind Act283 have resulted in all Wisconsin
273. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 629–30 (Wis. 1998).
274. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992).
275. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
276. See supra notes 35–100 and accompanying text.
277. WIS. STAT. § 118.165, supra note 140 and accompanying text.
278. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(6m).
279. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 21. See also CHRISTOPHER
A.LUBIENSKI & SARAH THEULE LUBIENSKI, THE PUBLIC SCHOOL ADVANTAGE: WHY PUBLIC
SCHOOLS OUTPERFORM PRIVATE SCHOOLS (Univ. of Chicago Press 2013); GARY MIRON ET
AL., EXPLORING THE SCHOOL CHOICE UNIVERSE: EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Kevin
G. Welner & Alex Molnar, eds., 2013); DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE
PRIVATIZATION MOVEMENT AND THE DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2014).
280. See e.g., Kern Alexander, Asymmetric Information, Parental Choice, Vouchers,
Charter Schools and Stiglitz, 38 J. EDUC. FIN. 170 (2012); JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE
RATIONAL MARKEY A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009).
281. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 476 (Wis. 1992); Jackson v. Benson, 578
N.W.2d 602, 629–30 (Wis. 1998).
282. 2013 Wis. Act 8, §38 (March 28, 2013).
283. 20 U.S.C. § 6301, et seq. (2012).
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public schools being assessed yearly for performance both in the aggregate
and disaggregated by gender, race, and disability.284 What counts as
accountability for public investments in education is quite different from
the expectations of the 1990s and may weigh into any consideration of
“public purpose.” Finally, one telling omission from the invigorated
authority of the state superintendent and DPI is the power to demand
improvement or bar participation of low performing MPCP schools. As
long as the MPCP private school meets 1 of the 4 standards of its choice, is
fiscally solvent, and maintains a safe and healthy facility, DPI has no
authority to address instructional quality issues.285 This lack of legislated
authority exists by design as the legislature has purposefully limited the
agency’s authority over the program. DPI’s statutorily limited authority
stands in stark contrast to the obligations the agency has if a public school
(traditional, magnet, or charter) demonstrates performance problems.286 Is
the public purpose of “education” met, if data shows the programming
offered does not result in students’ proficiency in basic skills?287 At what
point does this lack of similar oversight of the private voucher schools
suggest that the public purpose is no longer met?
While a reviewing court may still find sufficient evidence of a “public
purpose” of the voucher program when viewed in isolation, a different
result may occur when viewed in light of contemporaneous cuts to public
school districts. During the same period the state legislature enacted
legislation to grow the voucher program, it took action to cut support for
public school districts.288 Accordingly, a court may conclude that the public
purpose of a private school voucher program is lost at the point that the
program can be shown to interfere with the state’s obligations under the
Education Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution.289 Likewise, returning to
284. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3)(2004); see also Wis. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, Office of
Educational Accountability and the Office of Student Assessment, http://oea.dpi.wi.gov/.
285. See, e.g., Responses of State Superintendent Tony Evers, supra note 165; see also
Letter from Janet Jenkins to Renee Wohlenhaus , supra note 178.
286. WIS. STAT. Chapters 115–121; Wis. Admin. Code PI.
287. See WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, OVERALL MPS RESULTS HIGHER THAN
CHOICE
SCHOOLS
ON
STATEWIDE
EXAMS
2
(2011),
available
at
http://dpi.wi.gov/eis/pdf/dpinr2011_30.pdf.; see also Devon Carlson et al. Life After
Vouchers: What Happens to Students Who Leave Private Schools for the Traditional Public
Sector? 35 EDUC. EVALUATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS 179 (2013) (finding that voucher
students who left private schools and enrolled in public schools saw substantial achievement
gains).
288. See supra notes 250–254 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 245–262 and accompanying text.
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the apparent segregative effect of the voucher program as regards children
with disabilities, if legislative support for the program substantially disrupts
the uniform character of the public school system, then it may be found to
subvert rather than serve a public purpose.290
VI. Conclusion
As this analysis shows, the MPCP has evolved in size, scope, and
expense. A majority of the private participating schools are dependent on
the state funds that accompany the vouchers used by more than 80% of
their student population. While the program has changed in many
substantive ways, no changes have affected how children with disabilities
may participate or the authority of the Department of Public Instruction to
oversee instructional quality.
Current enrollment demographics show that children with disabilities
have little access to the MPCP, resulting in a higher than expected
concentration of children with disabilities in Milwaukee’s public schools
and the commensurate responsibility to provide the special education
services they need. That pattern led to a complaint and subsequent
investigation by the United States Department of Justice. The DOJ directed
the state to engage in more rigorous oversight in order to ensure that the
program satisfies the dictates of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Those
directives have been met with resistance by the DPI, continuing the
controversy of whether the program operates free from discrimination on
the basis of disability.
The facts of legislative program design, delivery, and oversight
suggest that should the complainants desire to push forward, a reasonable
case can be made that the program violates the non-discrimination
requirements of federal law. The same pattern, when viewed in light of the
severe budget cuts visited on public school districts, also indicates that the
program may be vulnerable to challenge under the Education Clause and
public purpose doctrine of the state Constitution as the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has previously held that the voucher program is permissible only so
long as the legislature first satisfies its obligations to adequately fund public
schools.
However, should claimants successfully litigate such allegations, any
infirmities would likely be cured by subsequent legislative action. Issues
290.

See supra notes 263–272 and accompanying text.
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regarding the accessibility of the program for children with disabilities
could be corrected by establishing a means to provide them with special
education and related services comparable to their peers in the public
system and providing DPI the statutory authority to ensure the program
operates in a non-discriminatory manner. A finding that the program
violates the state constitution because the state has unconstitutionally
eroded its support for a “system of district schools as nearly uniform as
practicable”291 or because it fails to sufficiently serve a public purpose
would likely be addressed by restoring public funding to public schools
rather than dismantling the private school voucher program. Such a result
would be ironic, indeed, as the private school program would only be
constitutionally permissible once sufficient reinvestment in the public
system occurred. In essence, the state would then be supporting two
systems of educationone public and one private, though arguably private
in name only.
Distinctions that once were clearpublic school versus private
school—thus become blurred under the country’s oldest voucher program.
Whether or not MPCP survives this latest legal challenge with or without
revision, it is clear that the MPCP continues to generate controversy. The
public–private distinction will also likely continue to attract public policy
arguments as this first major experiment in market principles enters its next
chapter.

291.

WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3.
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Appendix A

Table A1: Changes to MPCP Provisions Concerning Private School
Participation
Original
requirement
Located in the city
of Milwaukee
Non-sectarian

Changes and year of change

Meets health and
safety standards

Provide certificate of
occupancy in advance of
participation (2004)

Eliminated location
requirement (2011)
Eliminated nonsectarian
requirement (1995)
Accepts voucher Schools permitted to
as full tuition
charge reasonable fees and
may charge tuition above
voucher amount if child is
in high school and family
income exceeds 2.2 times
the federal poverty level
(2011).
Cap for vouchers Increased to 65% (1993)
Removed cap on
of 49% of school’s
schools (1995)
population
Meets 1 of 4
standards: (70% of
pupils advance 1
grade level OR
90% attendance
rate OR 80%
demonstrate
significant
academic progress
OR 70% parental
involvement as
defined by private
school)
Comply with 20
U.S.C. 2000d
(prohibits racial
discrimination)
Superintendent may
immediately
terminate
participation of
school if imminent
harm to health and
safety of children
(2004)

Applied new indoor
environmental quality
standards to MPCP
schools (2009).
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Original
Changes and year of change
requirement
Appoint
representative to a
council
Uses random
Siblings may be given
Schools must provide
process if
preference (1995)
reason for rejection
applications
of application;
exceed space
rejection on
available
permitted if capacity
reached (2009)
Submit an annual financial Set standards for
audit (1995)
audits (2004).
Religious schools may not
require participation in
religious activities (1995).
Provide proof of financial
viability, fiscal practices,
and administrator has had
fiscal management training
(2004).
Teachers must be high
Teachers and
school graduates or hold
administrators must
equivalence (2005).
hold bachelor’s
degrees; teacher’s
aides must be high
school graduates
(2009).
School must be accredited Marquette
by 1 of 5 private school
University’s Institute
organizations (2005).
for the
Transformation of
Learning no longer
may accredit schools,
However, unless
already accredited,
pre-accreditation
required from
Marquette
University’s Institute
for the
Transformation of
Learning before
participation (2009).
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Preference for those
previously attending
private school
permissible (2013).

Must use CPA &
follow AICPA
standards (2011).

Preaccreditation may
be done by 5 private
school organizations
(2011).
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Original
requirement

Changes and year of change
Must administer nationally
normed tests in reading,
math, & science in 4th, 8th
and 10th grades & submit to
School Choice
Demonstration Project
(2005)

Beginning 2010Administer all state
2011, must
assessments (2013).
administer state
achievement tests,
including 3rd grade
reading test, in a
manner similar to
public schools and
provide results to
School Choice
Demonstration
Project through 2011
(2009)
Must transfer pupil records Maintain a student
within 5 days when
information system
requested (2009)
with unique student
identifiers (2014).
Must pay a non-refundable
fee to participation each
year; fees used to fund a
full-time auditor to
evaluate financial
information (2009)
Requires 1050 hours in
direct pupil instruction in
grades 1-6 and 1137 hours
in grades 7-12 (2009)
Provide parents
information about school
including governance,
profit status, nonharassment process,
suspension/expulsion
policy, transfer credits
policy, visitor policy
(2009)
Adopt academic standards
that apply to public schools
(2009)

